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RATIONALIZING THE TAXATION OF
REORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
Herwig J. Schlunk"
This article examines the taxation of human shareholders in the
case of mergers and acquisitions. Currently, the relevant law is
extraordinarily complex, utterly inconsistent, and in many instances
arguably unfair. There are really only two plausible ways to cure these
ills. The first would involve moving to a tax system with more fulsome
gain recognition, most likely in the form of mark-to-market taxation.
This option is not in my opinion feasible (either technically or what is
perhaps more important,politically). Accordingly, the second potential
cure, moving to a tax system with less gain recognition,merits attention.
In this article, I propose such a tax system. In particular,under my
proposal, a human shareholder whose stock is sold or exchanged
pursuant to a merger or acquisitionwould be entitled to nonrecognition
treatment so long as either (1) he receives stock in the acquiring
corporation or (2) he involuntarily receives consideration other than
stock in the acquiring corporation but promptly and appropriately
reinvests such consideration.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The law governing the tax treatment of shareholders involved in
corporate mergers and acquisitions has been relatively stable for the
better part of the federal income tax's history. This is remarkable if
for no other reason than that Congress generally tinkers with the
Internal Revenue Code (Code) at least once a year, and enacts
significant tax changes every two or three years. But it is doubly
remarkable given the quirky, excessively complex, and utterly
inconsistent nature of the applicable "corporate reorganization" rules.
Could quirkiness, excessive complexity, and utter inconsistency
possibly be a virtue?
What are the benefits of quirkiness, excessive complexity, and
utter inconsistency (other than providing employment for tax
professionals)? The answer is that these features, taken together,
make it possible for shareholders, as a group, to choose how they will
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be taxed when they "sell" their corporation. Thus, if shareholders, as a
group, are not averse to recognition, they can choose a taxable
transaction structure. But if enough shareholders are averse to
recognition, they can choose a largely economically equivalent
transaction structure that has the signal difference that it has been
statutorily blessed with nonrecognition treatment. It is surely the
desirability (from the shareholder viewpoint) of this barely hidden
"electivity" that underlies the historic stability of the corporate
reorganization rules.' But alas, this electivity is now under attack, at
least in the public company context.
Electivity still operates in the context of mergers and acquisitions
of closely held corporations. In that context, shareholders tend to
have a large degree of common interest. Thus, even if certain
shareholders do not have a loathing of recognition, perhaps because
they desire nothing other than a complete cashing-out to fund a trip
around the world, they tend to appreciate that a like lack of loathing
may not be prevalent among their fellow shareholders (who are not
infrequently beneficiaries of their largesse). Thus, the "selling"
shareholders generally will be willing to accommodate transaction
structures that allow their fellows desiring nonrecognition to achieve
it. Obviously, the corporate reorganization rules aid and abet the
successful search for such structures.
Electivity is no longer the rule in the public company context. In
that context, shareholders tend to have much less common interest.
Increasingly, a large majority of public company shareholders are
indifferent to gain recognition. These include tax exempt
organizations and foreigners, neither of which generally pays any tax
on capital gains. These also include many mutual funds and hedge
funds. Such funds do not themselves pay any tax on capital gains, and
while they must "distribute" all such gains to shareholders who may
pay tax on them, the possibility of somewhat remote taxation tends
not to be too troubling to many fund managers. Finally, these also
include dealers in securities, who must pay tax on gains whether such
gains are technically recognized or not. These various tax indifferent
shareholders tend to prefer receiving cash consideration when they
"sell" their shares in a public company, primarily because cash
consideration has an unvarying value. Unfortunately, unlike "selling"
That electivity is the silent motivation behind the corporate reorganization
rules is illustrated by the only recent "significant" change to those rules, a
liberalization of the continuity of interest regulations in the late 1990s. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.368-1(e) (2007). The new rules make it significantly easier for taxpayers who do
not care about recognition to accommodate those who do.
2
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shareholders in the closely held corporations' context, tax indifferent
shareholders in the public company context are generally unwilling to
accommodate the tax planning of their non-tax-indifferent human
brethren. Thus, increasingly, human shareholders of public companies
are having unwelcome gain recognition events thrust upon them.3
This article takes the current increased exposure of human
shareholders to unwelcome recognition events as an excuse to
reexamine the taxation of corporate mergers and acquisitions in
general. It is divided into eight parts. Part II motivates the discussion
by detailing two corporate transactions and describing the current
wholly irrational and inconsistent taxation of each. It also sets forth
the possibilities for taxing such transactions consistently. Part III
examines nonrecognition transactions in noncorporate settings, in the
hope of finding an economic or perhaps other robust basis for the
grant of nonrecognition treatment. Alas, no economic or other robust
basis is found. However, several ad hoc noneconomic bases are
discussed. Part IV contains an economic analysis of the two corporate
transactions detailed in Part II, in order to see how such transactions
compare to the nonrecognition transactions described in Part III. It
concludes that the corporate transactions are at least as worthy of
nonrecognition treatment as the noncorporate transactions.
Part V briefly examines the history of the corporate
reorganization provisions of the Code in order to determine whether
an earlier Congress believed there was anything unique about the
corporate context that justifies either a less or a more liberal
nonrecognition regime than is found in non-corporate contexts. The

3 We live in an age in which taxable (cash) acquisitions of public companies
by
management teams, private equity firms, or other corporations are all the rage. In the
space of a few recent months, a number of large public companies, including HCA
Inc., Freescale Semiconductor, Kinder-Morgan Inc., and Univision Communications
Inc., have all announced management-led and private-equity-firm-assisted cash
buyouts. These deals are large, worth $20.98 billion, $17.60 billion, $14.56 billion, and
$12.23 billion, respectively. See Sarah McBride & Dennis K. Berman, Clear Channel
Buyout Talks Fuel Concern of Management Conflicts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2006, at
Al. Clear Channel Communications itself joined the list the following day, when it
agreed to an $18.7 billion buyout. Note that the article failed to mention at least two
other roughly contemporaneous deals of comparable size (Harrah's Entertainment,
Inc. at $15.4 billion and Albertson's at $11 billion), and of course did not mention any
subsequent deals, including the $19 billion deal for Equity Office Properties Trust
announced less than a week later (on November 20, 2006). A more recent list of large
private equity purchases, both of public companies and of subsidiaries of such
companies, can be found in Michael Merced & Eric Dash, Banks to Test Debt Market
this Week, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2007, at Cl, Cl1.
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short answer is that no enlightenment is to be found in such history.
Part VI begins to tackle the question of rationalizing the tax treatment
of corporate mergers and acquisitions. It does this by describing three
proposals: one from the early 1980s by the American Law Institute
(ALI), one from the late 1980s by David Shakow, and one from the
very recent past by Yariv Brauner. Part VII is the heart of the
enterprise. It sets forth a menu of consistent tax alternatives and
debates the pros and cons of each. It ultimately (and to an academic
reader perhaps surprisingly) extols the virtues of a tax regime of
expanded nonrecognition treatment. In particular, I propose a tax
regime in which shareholders would receive nonrecognition treatment
in the context of a merger or acquisition whenever they either (1)
exchange their stock for the stock of some other corporate party to
the merger or acquisition, or (2) involuntarily exchange their stock for
consideration other than stock but promptly and appropriately
reinvest such consideration. Part VIII is a brief conclusion.
II. A TALE OF TWO CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
I will begin my discussion with two corporate acquisitions, each
quite different from the other. I make no claim that either of these
acquisitions is in any way typical of the larger run of corporate
acquisitions. Each is in fact quite unusual. Nonetheless, each is
possible, and the tax law must therefore be able to deal with both.
How the tax law currently deals with them, and how it should ideally
deal with them, is the subject of this article.
A. Acquisition #1, VariantA
Suppose an individual (H) owns all of the stock of a corporation
(X) with a tax basis of essentially $0. X is in the oil exploration
business; it borrows money, purchases real estate with promising
geological markers, and drills for oil. It currently has borrowings of $2
million. Happily, it has just successfully drilled its first well. The well is
not a very big one. Still, with a parcel of land and a successful well, X's
assets have an estimated fair value of $3 million. Perhaps more
importantly, X's parcel of land is situated on property that General
Electric Corporation (GE) believes would be an ideal location for a
new factory. Thus, GE approaches H about the possibility of
acquiring X.
Following some back and forth, H agrees to sell X to GE in
exchange for $1 million worth of GE's publicly traded common stock.
Accordingly, GE organizes a transitory subsidiary (S) and transfers $1
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million of newly issued GE common stock to S in exchange for all of
S's stock. Immediately thereafter, S merges with and into X, with X
surviving. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, H's X stock
is exchanged for the GE common stock owned by S and GE's S stock
is converted into all of the outstanding stock of X. Thus, H walks away
with a block of GE common stock and X becomes a wholly owned
subsidiary of GE.
Given that GE's equity has a market value of nearly $400 billion,
H's block of stock represents approximately 0.00025% of GE's
outstanding equity. Given that GE's liabilities total nearly an
additional $600 billion, so that its assets total nearly $1 trillion, X's
assets represent approximately 0.0003% of GE's assets. It follows that
for every dollar worth of GE stock H owns, only 0.0003 cents of such
dollar reflects a continuing indirect interest in the assets of X.
Nonetheless, providing that certain nominal conditions are satisfied,
H is not taxed upon his exchange of X stock for GE stock, since such
exchange qualifies as a corporate reorganization within the meaning
of section 368.' Note that this tax result is not adversely impacted by
any of the following facts:
The consideration H receives is extremely liquid, since GE stock
is actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
The consideration H receives is easy to value, since GE stock is
actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
The consideration H receives represents only a de minimis
continuing investment in the assets of X; of the assets underlying any
given dollar of H's GE stock, only 0.0003 cents are H's original
indirectly owned assets.
The consideration H receives is received as a result of a
transaction that H entered into willingly.
B. Acquisition #1, Variant B
The facts are the same as for Acquisition #1A, but the mechanics
are different. GE finances the acquisition of X by selling $1 million of
4 In an excess of caution, in order to avoid any possible argument that the

reorganization lacks continuity of business enterprise, GE could consider retaining
not just the parcel of land, but the oil well too. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (2007). Such
retention would not necessarily obligate it to enter a new line of business; it could
outsource the actual extraction to some third party contractor.
The transaction qualifies as a corporate reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(B). I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). It also qualifies as a corporate reorganization
under sections 368(a)(1)(A) and 368(a)(2)(E). I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(A), 368(a)(2)(E).
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newly issued shares in the public equity market. It uses the $1 million
of cash proceeds to purchase all of X's stock from H. H immediately
uses the $1 million of cash he receives from GE to purchase $1 million
of GE common stock in the public equity market. Thus, the net effect
of the sequence of transactions in Variant B is identical, from the
vantage of every single party to the acquisition, including H, to the
transaction in Acquisition #1A. However, the tax consequences under
current law are different from those of Acquisition #1A. In particular,
since H received cash in exchange for his X stock, he is fully taxed on
his gain with respect to such stock, irrespective of how quickly he
reinvested such cash in GE's common stock.6
C. Acquisition #2, Variant A
Suppose that an individual (H) is a shareholder of a closely held
corporation (X) who has a tax basis of essentially $0 in his stock. X's
capitalization consists solely of 500,000 shares of Class A Common
Stock and 500,000 shares of Class B Common Stock; it has no debt or
liabilities of any kind. The Class A shares have a liquidation
preference of $40 per share; after satisfaction of such liquidation
preference the Class A shares participate equally with the Class B
shares in the receipt of any additional liquidation proceeds. Finally,
the Class A shares are entitled to five votes per share, and the Class B
shares are entitled to one vote per share. Suppose that H owns
100,000 of the Class B shares. Thus, in rough terms, H owns 10% of
the upside appreciation of X. However, H's shares entitle him to only
3.33% of X's vote.
X is in the oil exploration business. It owns several parcels of land
and has several active wells. Given the wells and related assets, an
appraiser has estimated the fair value of X's assets at approximately
$30 million. If the appraisal is accurate, then taking the aggregate $20
million liquidation preference of the Class A stock into account, H's
stock in X should be worth approximately $1 million. But given the
uncertainty inherent in any appraisal, as well as the absence of a liquid
market in either X's assets or its stock, who really knows!
X has come to the attention of Roll-Up Co. (RUC), a small
portfolio company controlled by a private equity fund. RUC's
capitalization consists solely of 1 million shares of common stock and
$40 million of long-term debt. An appraiser has estimated the fair
value of RUC's assets at approximately $50 million. If the appraisal is

6

See I.R.C. § 1001.

30
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accurate, then taking the $40 million of debt into account, RUC's
stock should be worth approximately $10 million in the aggregate. But
once again, who really knows!
RUC and the principals of X enter into negotiations regarding a
business combination. After a fair bit of back and forth, centered
largely on questions of valuation, they reach an agreement, subject to
the approval of X's shareholders, pursuant to which RUC will acquire
X. Under the terms of the agreement, X will become a wholly owned
subsidiary of RUC; the Class A shareholders of X will receive $40 of
cash (funded by $20 million of new borrowing by RUC from a bank
(Bank)) and one newly issued share of RUC in exchange for each
Class A share of X; the Class B shareholders of X will receive one
newly issued share of RUC in exchange for each Class B share of X.
X's shareholders vote on the proposed acquisition. H would like
to continue deferring tax on his unrealized gain and accordingly votes
"No." However, a large number of X's other shareholders are largely
indifferent to tax recognition. Some of these may be tax-exempt
organizations that are exempt from capital gains taxation.7 Others
may be mutual funds that do not pay any tax themselves, although
some of their shareholders might. 8 And still others may be individuals
who have a high tax basis in their shares, either as the result of having
recently purchased such shares, or as a result of having been the
beneficiaries of the stepped-up basis at death. 9 All of these tax
indifferent shareholders vote "Yes."
Accordingly, the acquisition proceeds apace. First, RUC borrows
$20 million from Bank. Then, RUC organizes a transitory subsidiary
(S) and transfers $20 million in cash and 1 million newly issued shares
of RUC common stock to S in exchange for all of S's stock.
Immediately thereafter, S merges with and into X, with X surviving.
Pursuant to the merger agreement, each Class A share of X stock is
exchanged for $40 of the cash and one share of the RUC common
stock owned by S, each Class B share of X stock is exchanged for one
share of the RUC common stock owned by S, and RUC's S stock is
converted into all of the outstanding stock of X. Thus, in particular, H
walks away with 100,000 shares of RUC common stock.
Whether or not the aforementioned appraisals were reasonably
accurate, H's block of stock represents 5.0% of RUC's outstanding
equity. What that equity represents, however, does depend on the
7 I.R.C. § 512(b)(5).
8

I.R.C §§ 851-855.

9 I.R.C. §§ 1012, 1014(b)(9).
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accuracy of the appraisals. Thus, if the appraisals were reasonably
accurate, then X's $30 million of gross assets represent 37.5% of
RUC's post-acquisition gross assets. As such, it follows that for every
dollar worth of RUC stock H owns, 37.5 cents of such dollar reflects a
continuing indirect interest in the assets of X. Nonetheless, H is taxed
upon his exchange of X stock for RUC stock, since such exchange
does not qualify as a corporate reorganization within the meaning of
section 368.0 Note that this tax result is not ameliorated by any of the
following facts:
The consideration H receives is illiquid, since RUC stock is not
traded and is, in fact, effectively controlled by a private equity fund.
The consideration H receives is difficult to value. Note that there
were no contemporaneous cash transactions involving the Class B
stock. Moreover, the exchange ratio between the Class B stock and
the RUC common stock would have been the same for any other
combination of values of X's and RUC's aggregate pre-acquisition
equity that valued the former at $20 million more than the latter.
The consideration H receives represents a significant continuing
investment in the assets of X; of the assets underlying any given dollar
of H's RUC stock, 37.5 cents are H's original indirectly owned assets.
The consideration H receives is received over his objections as a
result of a transaction that he did everything in his power to avoid.
D. Acquisition #2, Variant B
The background facts are the same as for Acquisition #2A, but
the mechanics are different. In this variant, it is X that acquires RUC.
First, X borrows $20 million from Bank. Second, X recapitalizes its
Class A Common Stock; each share of Class A Common Stock is
exchanged for one share of Class B Common Stock and $40 of cash.
Third, RUC merges with and into X, with X surviving. Pursuant to the
merger agreement, all issued and outstanding shares of RUC are
converted on a one-for-one basis into shares of X's Class B Common
Stock and all issued and outstanding shares of X remain outstanding.
to The transaction cannot qualify as a corporate reorganization since the
transaction structure has been carefully chosen to fail the continuity of interest
requirement. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (2007); see John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering,
296 U.S. 374, 376-77 (1935). Moreover, it is not a section 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization,
in spite of the 50% overlap of ownership of X and the post-acquisition RUC, because
section 368(a)(1)(D) does not apply to transfers of stock. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D).
Finally, it is not a section 351 transaction since former shareholders of X do not have
section 368(c) control of the post-acquisition RUC. I.R.C. § 351.
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From the vantage of each and every party to the acquisition, including
H, the net effect of the sequence of transactions in Variant B is
economically identical to the transaction in Acquisition #2A (the only
difference is that the name of the surviving corporation is RUC in the
first case and X in the second). However, the tax consequences under
current law are different from those of Acquisition #2A. In particular,
since H did not sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of any of his
shares of X's Class B Common Stock, he has not suffered a realization
event. Accordingly, he is not taxed as a result of Acquisition #2B.
E. Consistent Frameworks
I posit that a rational tax law should be consistent. By this I mean
that it should tax the substance of H's transactions, rather than their
form. Thus, so long as one agrees that the substance of Acquisition
#1A is the same as the substance of Acquisition #1B and that the
substance of Acquisition #2A is the same as the substance of
Acquisition #2B, there are only four possible ways for a rational tax
law to handle Acquisitions #1 (however consummated) and #2
(however consummated). This is illustrated in Table 1.
TABLE

1. TAX ALTERNATIVES

Acquisitions #1A
and #1B

Acquisitions #2A
and #2B

Most Intuitively
Appealing Law

Taxable

Not taxable

Least Intuitively
Appealing Law

Not taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

Not taxable

Not taxable

Not taxable (A) and

Taxable (A) and not

taxable (B)

taxable (B)

Expanded
Recognition
Expanded
Nonrecognition
Current Law

Current law, as noted, taxes Acquisition #1A differently from
Acquisition #1B, and taxes Acquisition #2A differently from
Acquisition #2B. Thus, it must either be the case that current law is
irrational, or that current law divines some substantive difference
between Acquisition #1A and Acquisition #1B, and similarly between
Acquisition #2A and Acquisition #2B. The substantive difference in
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the first case could only be that the interposition of cash in H's hands
in Acquisition #1B temporarily gives H lower (transaction) cost access
to alternative investment (and consumption) choices than does his
receipt of GE stock in Acquisition #1A. The substantive difference in
the second case could only be that the name of the surviving
corporation somehow matters.
I do not accept that the name of the surviving corporation can
ever matter enough that it should determine the tax outcome; after all,
the name of the surviving corporation can always be changed." Thus,
there is no rational reason to tax Acquisition #2A differently from
Acquisition #2B. On the other hand, I do accept the notion that the
interposition of cash may be a sufficiently substantive difference that
the tax law can reasonably give it outcome determinative importance,
particularly if, as in Acquisition #1B, such interposition is not wholly
formal.12 Still, given the fleeting nature of the interposition of the cash
in such acquisition, this is surely not the best position for a rational tax
law to take.
If as just suggested the circumstances support taxing H in a
consistent way for his role in each of Acquisition #1 (however
consummated) and Acquisition #2 (however consummated), the most
intuitively appealing way to tax him is surely to tax him for his part in
the former, but not for his part in the latter. (It follows that the least
" It may be argued that names do matter. After all, corporations sometimes
spend significant resources on the question of whether and how to change their
names. For example, United Air Lines, wanting to emphasize the fact that it was more
than an airline (it had expanded into other travel related businesses such as hotels),
unveiled the quickly forgotten name, Allegis, with significant fanfare. And Philip
Morris, desiring to enlighten the world that it had become much more than a
purveyor of cigarettes, heralded its new name, Altria. And the list could go on and on.
Nonetheless, in spite of such expenditures and such hooplah, I am not aware of any
study that demonstrates that any public corporation has experienced a statistically
significant change in its market value solely as a result of the change of its name.
12 Even if H were contractually required to use
his cash proceeds to buy the
stock of GE, so long as he was required to buy such shares in the public market, the
imposition of cash would not be wholly formal since both GE and the public would
appear to be in different positions than they would have been in had GE issued shares
to H directly (an appearance that is false, of course, if GE simply reduced its own
periodic public market share repurchases by the amount of the cash paid to H). Note
that the tax result would arguably be different if H were contractually obliged to
purchase the shares from GE, rather than in the public market. In such case, all cash
that initially flowed out of GE would flow right back into GE. Accordingly, a
substance-over-form analysis would arguably become applicable, and would likely
allow the Internal Revenue Service (Service), and possibly even H, to ignore the
interposition of cash.
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intuitively appealing way to tax H is to tax him for his part in the

latter, but not for his part in the former.) Why? In Acquisition #1, H
affirmatively chooses to exchange his highly illiquid corporate stock
for highly liquid corporate stock that has no meaningful economic

connection with his original investment. Such a transaction all but
screams for the recognition of gain and the imposition of tax. On the
other hand, in Acquisition #2, H's investment is modified without his
acquiescence, his highly illiquid corporate stock remains highly

illiquid, and the assets underlying such stock in significant measure
continue to be the same. Such a transaction may or may not scream
for nonrecognition treatment. But if there is any proper place for
nonrecognition treatment in the context of corporate reorganizations
or other acquisitions, this is surely it.
There are two other ways for a rational tax law to handle H's part
in Acquisitions #1 and #2. The one generally favored by tax academics
would call for expanded recognition: H would be condemned to full

and immediate recognition of gain for his part in Acquisition #1
(however consummated) and Acquisition #2 (however consummated).

The most prevalent argument in support of this treatment is based on
the premise that the realization principle, with its attendant deferral of
tax on some economic income, damages an income tax system by
distorting
taxpayer
behavior.
In
particular,
taxpayers
disproportionately invest in assets that provide potential deferral, and
then hold such assets far longer than they would in the absence of
deferral (the so-called "lock-in effect").14
Of course,
under
current
law, attempted
corporate
reorganizations (such as Acquisitions #1A and #2A) do not actually
13

For a discussion specifically limited to the reorganization context, see Yariv

Brauner, A Good Old Habit, or Just an Old One? Preferential Tax Treatment for
Reorganizations,2004 BYU L. REV. 1 (2004). For more general discussions, see Alan
J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167 (1991);
David J. Shakow, Taxation without Realization:A Proposalfor Accrual Taxation, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986); Reed Shuldiner, A GeneralApproach to the Taxation of
FinancialInstruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 243 (1992). Note, however, that not all scholars
decry realization. David M. Schizer has argued that realization can be seen as a
(useful) subsidy encouraging private savings and investment. David M. Schizer,
Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549 (1998). Edward A. Zelinsky has
argued that realization is better than the alternatives, primarily because it is
administratively achievable. Edward Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation,
Sectoral Accretionism, and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861
(1997).
14 See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON.
REV. 167 (1991).
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rely on the realization principle for special tax treatment. Such
reorganizations are conceded to involve realization events; they
merely involve realization events that, if a number of specific
requirements are satisfied (as they are in Acquisition #1A but not in
Acquisition #2A), are statutorily favored with nonrecognition
treatment, i.e., additional deferral above
S • 15 and beyond that generally
provided by the realization principal. To an academic who is
predisposed to opposing the deferral of tax even in the case of
nonrealization events (such as Acquisition #2B), extending such
deferral to instances of conceded realization is like rubbing salt in a
wound, unless some very good alternative justification for deferral can
be found. Unfortunately, the one such justification which would
probably serve - namely that the corporate reorganization provisions
encourage economically efficient transactions that 16otherwise would
not occur - is woefully lacking in empirical support.
The final possibility for a rational income tax regime is to expand
the availability of nonrecognition treatment, and specifically to favor
H with nonrecognition treatment for his part in both Acquisition #1
(however consummated) and Acquisition #2 (however consummated).
So long as the context is a modification of the income tax, this7
possibility has not elicited much recent academic support.
Nonetheless, it did elicit considerable support in an earlier age when
scholars did not so universally revile the deferral of tax."' The primary
motivation for expanding nonrecognition treatment to all
shareholders, like H, who (ultimately) receive consideration....
consisting19
solely of stock of the acquiring corporation, was tax simplification.
But a secondary motivation was the unfairness of making one

15See I.R.C. §§ 354, 361, 1001.
16 See Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis
of Realization and Recognition
Rules Under the FederalIncome Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1 (1992); see also Brauner, supra
note 13.
17 Many academics advocate replacing the income
tax with a consumption tax or
a cash-flow tax. David F. Bradford, What are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays
Them?, 39 TAx NOTES 383 (Apr. 18, 1988). If such a change were to be made,
realization and a fortiori recognition would cease to play a role in determining the tax
base. Thus, Acquisition #2 would indeed be taxed in the same way as Acquisition #1.
However, achieving such equalization would be only a by-product of, not an explicit
motivation for, adopting a consumption tax or a cash-flow tax.
Is See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C 167
(1982) [hereinafter ALl PROJECT]. Note that the American Law Institute (ALl)
Project would not actually have provided H with nonrecognition treatment in the case
of Acquisition #1B; the interposition of cash, however transitorily, would be fatal.
19

Id. at 155.
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shareholder's tax treatment depend on the tax treatment of his fellow
shareholders (as is the case with H's tax treatment in Acquisition
#2A).2
III. NONRECOGNITION TREATMENT IN GENERAL

A. Non-CorporateContexts
In order to put corporate reorganizations and other acquisitions
into an appropriate context, it is useful to compare them with
transactions outside of the corporate context that are favored with
nonrecognition (and in some cases nonrealization) treatment. But in
what ways should these transactions be compared? I think that the
only way to meaningfully compare transactions is to measure their
impact on the one thing that the investing taxpayer cares most about:
his investment return. I propose an admittedly ad hoc arithmetic
approach. An individual (H) initially owns a capital asset (X) in which
he has a significant unrealized capital gain. If H does nothing, but
remains the owner of X, he will experience a certain additional
(positive or negative) investment return over some relevant time
horizon. If X does something, that is, if X modifies his ownership
position in X in some way, he will over the same time horizon
experience a possibly very different additional investment return. I
ask initially: "Is favorable tax treatment in any way limited to
circumstances where the post-modification additional investment
returns do not differ too materially from the unmodified additional
investment returns?"
Consider the following hypothetical investment. H owns asset X
which has a tax basis of $2 million and a fair value of $3 million, and
which is subject to a liability of $2 million. Over the relevant time
horizon, assume that X generates sufficient current cash flow to
exactly provide both the lender and H with appropriate risk-adjusted
returns, but no more.2' At the end of the relevant time horizon, X
20

Id. at 164; see also Bernard Wolfman, "Continuity of Interest" and the

American Law Institute Study, 57 TAXEs 840, 842 (1979).
21 The concrete numbers behind the model are as follows. The
time horizon is
three years. All parties are risk-neutral. The interest rate is 10% per annum. Thus, X
generates $300,000 of annual cash at the end of the first, second, and third year;
immediately after distribution of the third year's annual cash, X adjusts in value.
Assuming that annual cash is distributed in the same ratios in each year, and assuming
that X's ultimate change in value is properly priced in the market, it will be the case
that H will receive $62,235 of annual cash flow and the lender will receive the
remaining $237,765.
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generates a single terminal random cash flow that with equal
probability lies anywhere between $1 million and $5 million. Thus,
25% of the time, H's unrealized gain of $1 million will evaporate
(since X's terminal cash flow of less than or equal to $2 million will be
entirely dedicated to repaying the lender). The remaining 75% of the
time, H will receive an additional capital-gain-type return that with
equal probability lies anywhere between -100% and +200%. H's
expected additional "capital gain" is +12.5%.
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There are a number of transactions that H, as the owner of X, can
engage in that will modify the returns from his investment in X but
that will not subject him to immediate taxation on his $1 million of
unrealized gain. The first I will consider is an installment sale subject
to section 453 .22While the ability to report gain on the installment
method may not appear to be a typical nonrecognition provision Installment sales are generally subject to so-called interest charge rules
imposed by section 453A, rules that are designed to significantly reduce the benefits
of tax deferral. I.R.C. § 453A. However, these rules will not apply in the instant case
since the aggregate amount of H's outstanding installment sale notes will be below the
$5 million threshold.
2
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after all, the realized gain is reported and taxed - it has the same
effect. Gain is reported and taxed only as cash is received. This
pattern of taxation is precisely the same as that under the broader run
of nonrecognition provisions, such as the reorganization provisions
themselves.2 3 The only difference is that in the case of an installment
sale, but not in the case of any of the other nonrecognition provisions,
H generally knows at the time of such sale exactly when and how
much cash is likely to be received.24
The generally parroted rationale for allowing nonrecognition
treatment in the case of a gain realized by virtue of an installment sale
is that the recipient of an installment sale note has not received a
liquid asset, and hence has no cash with which to pay his tax liability.25
While this bleak characterization of the recipient's posture may be
technically true (i.e., among other things, the recipient may have no
other liquid assets with which to pay the tax that is imposed on his $1
million realized gain), it should never be forgotten that the recipient's
difficulties are to at least some extent self-inflicted. Indeed, given the
modern world's relatively robust capital markets, I would venture to
say that of the two statements - (1) H paid tax on his gains under the
installment method because the buyer of X insisted on paying for X
with a note, and (2) H insisted that the buyer of X pay for X with a
note so that H would be able to pay tax on his gains under the
installment method - the second is far more likely to be true.
In order to compare apples to apples, I assume that H sells asset
X in exchange for a note that pays an amount of current interest that
is equal to the current cash flow H would have received from X. I also
assume that H receives in addition a principal amount of $3.125
million at the same time that X generates its terminal cash flow. 26 It is
pretty obvious, as illustrated in the chart below, that the returns
generated by H's modified portfolio bear little relation to the returns
that H would have received had he not entered into the installment
sale. To quantify the overlap of such returns in an ad hoc sort of way,
23

Others include sections 351 (corporate formations), 721 (contributions of

property to partnerships) and 1031 (like-kind exchanges). I.R.C. §§ 351, 721, 1031.
24 This is not true, however, in the case of a contingent payment
installment sale.
See Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c) (1994).
25 WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOSEPH BANKMAN & DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION 250 (14th ed. 2006).
26 Thus, the note pays interest of $62,235 per year for three years,
and then pays
the principal amount at the end of year three. As it does not affect my discussion, I
ignore the possibility that H might need to recharacterize a part of the $1.125 million
payment, received at the end of year three, as interest.
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note that H's return after entering into the installment sale will be
within 10% of what his return would have been had he not entered
into such sale only 5% of the time (i.e., for values of X between $3.025
million and $3.225 million). Thus, H receives nonrecognition
treatment with respect to an investment modification that has very
materially impacted his investment returns.
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Somewhat less dramatic, but along the same general lines as an
installment sale (at least in terms of its effect on H's additional
investment returns: increasing such returns during "bad" states of the
world and decreasing them during "good" states of the world), are
various investment modifications involving options. Thus, for
example, H could purchase a put option that gave him the right but
not the obligation to sell X at the end of three years for $3 million, in
exchange for a mandatory payment, also to be made at the end of
three years, in the amount of $375,000. The net effect would thus be
that H would receive a return of at least $625,000 (i.e., $3 million
minus $2 million debt repayment minus $375,000) on his investment.
Or, H could sell a call option that gave the buyer the right but not the
obligation to purchase X at the end of three years for $4 million, in
exchange for a mandatory payment, also to be made at the end of
three years, in the amount of $125,000. The net effect would thus be
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that H would be unable to receive a return in excess of $2.125 million
on his investment.

Asset X Subject to Options
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Note that H's additional investment return after purchasing the
given put option will be within 10% of what such return would have
been had he not purchased the put option only 5% of the time (i.e.,
for values of X between $2.525 million and $2.725 million).
Furthermore, his additional investment return after selling the given
call option will be within 10% of what such return would have been
had he not sold the call option only 5% of the time (i.e., for values of
X between $4.025 million and $4.225 million). As in the case of the
installment sale, H has materially modified his additional investment
returns. Nonetheless, he is not taxed on his unrealized gains at the
time that he enters into these modifications. Indeed, in these cases, H
continues to enjoy deferral with respect to his unrealized gains in X
not because the Code grants him nonrecognition treatment, but rather
because the Code does not even acknowledge that the investment
modification is a realization event and, as such, could be taxed. That
is, H legally owned asset X prior to entering in to the option
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transaction, and he continued to legally own asset X (although not
necessarily all of the investment upside or downside of asset X) after
entering into the investment modification. Thus, section 1001 has no
27
sale or exchange or other disposition upon which to operate.
The third investment modification I want to consider is a likekind exchange that garners nonrecognition treatment by virtue of the
application of section 1031. In order for H's modification to qualify
for like-kind exchange treatment, X must be the right sort of asset
(e.g., real estate that is either held for investment or used in the
conduct of an active trade or business), and X must be exchanged for
an asset (Y) that is also the right sort of asset (i.e., is of "like kind"
with asset X). 28 Since under the tax regulations an exchange of
undeveloped farm land in Kansas for an office building in Manhattan
qualifies as a like-kind exchange, it should be apparent that, at least in
the case of real property, H may engage in a wide variety of
exchanges, with vastly different possible economic outcomes, and still
obtain the blessings of section 1031.' 9
30
Why are such exchanges granted nonrecognition treatment?
One contributing factor is the liquidity rationale already mentioned in
the context of installment sales. That is, if H realizes gain on an
exchange of asset X for asset Y, he does not necessarily have any cash
with which to pay the tax on his gain. Once again, however, the
strength of this rationale is subject to considerable doubt, particularly
since the Code goes out of its way to allow H to inflict this wound
upon himself. That is, provided that H acts with dispatch, and
properly dots his i's and crosses his t's, he can engage in a like-kind
exchange even though the buyer of X actually pays cash for such
asset!31
The second, and perhaps more important factor, is that a classic
like-kind exchange produces no pricing information which can be used
to measure gain. As a result, if H exchanges asset X for asset Y, all
that can be said with certainty is that asset X and asset Y are of equal
value (in the sense that two presumably informed and rational
economic actors were willing to exchange them in an arms' length
27

I.R.C. § 1001. Note that entering into these specific options transactions would

not result in a deemed realization by virtue of the constructive sales rules. I.R.C. §
1259.
28 I.R.C. § 1031.
29

Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b) (1991).

See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't Need Another
Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 397 (1987).
31 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3).
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exchange); as to whether that value is $1 or $1 thousand or $1 million
or $1 billion there is no information whatever. Again, the classic case
is surely not the typical case. Often very precise valuation data exists.
In cases involving three party exchanges under section 1031(a)(3),
that very precise data is based on amounts of cash actually paid.
Nevertheless, for a subset of cases, the valuation concern may be
legitimate.
In any event, in order to compare apples to apples, I assume that
H exchanges asset X, subject to its liability, for like-kind asset Y with
the following characteristics. Y has a fair value of $5 million and is
acquired subject to a liability in the amount of $4 million. Over the
relevant time horizon, Y generates sufficient current cash flow to
exactly provide both the lender and H with appropriate risk-adjusted
32
returns, but no more. At the end of the relevant time horizon, Y
produces a single terminal random cash flow that with equal
probability lies anywhere between $0 and $8.33 million. Thus, 48% of
the time, H's initial investment and unrealized gain of $1 million will
evaporate (since Y's terminal cash flow of less than or equal to $4
million will be entirely dedicated to repaying the lender). The
remaining 52% of the time, H will receive an additional capital-gaintype return that with equal probability lies anywhere between -100%
and +333 %. H's expected additional "capital gain" is +12.5%.
Finally, for ease of mathematical exposition, I begin with the
simplifying assumption that the terminal values of X and Y are
uncorrelated. Under this admittedly extreme assumption, H's
additional investment return after engaging in the exchange will be
within 10% of what such return would have been had he not engaged
in the exchange only approximately 15.3% of the time (with nearly
90% of such overlap arising in situations where one or both of X and
Y has a value that is below that of its accompanying liability).

32 The concrete numbers behind the model are exactly as they were for X. The

time horizon is three years. All parties are risk-neutral. The interest rate is 10% per
annum. Thus, Y generates $500,000 of annual cash at the end of the first, second, and
third year; immediately after distribution of the third year's annual cash, Y adjusts in
value. Assuming that annual cash is distributed in the same ratios in each year, and
assuming that Y's ultimate change in value is properly priced in the market, it will be
the case that H will receive $62,235 of annual cash flow and the lender will receive the
remaining $437,765.
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Of course, even if X and Y are very different assets - like
undeveloped farm land in Kansas and an office building in Manhattan
- the returns from such assets are likely to be somewhat, albeit less
than perfectly, correlated by virtue of the fact that certain factors, like
interest rates and the general business climate, tend to impact all asset
prices in similar ways. Accordingly, and again for ease of
mathematical exposition, I will make the opposite simplifying
assumption, namely that the terminal values of X and Y are perfectly
correlated. Under this also admittedly extreme (but polar opposite)
assumption, H's additional investment return after engaging in the
exchange will be within 10% of what such return would have been had
he not engaged in the exchange only approximately 32.3% of the time
(with nearly 85% of such overlap arising in situations where one or
both of X and Y has a value that is below that of its accompanying
liability).
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Like-Kind Exchange (Perfectly Correlated)
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Given a more realistic assumption of partial but not complete
correlation, a result in between those presented above would be
produced. Whatever such intermediate result, however, H would
receive nonrecognition treatment with respect to an investment
modification that has very materially, albeit not as materially as in the
installment sale context, impacted his additional investment returns.
Just as a focus on additional investment returns makes the
installment sale statute seem more generous than the like-kind
exchange statute, so too does a focus on investment characteristics.
That is, the like-kind exchange statute can be viewed as providing
nonrecognition treatment on narrower grounds - liquidity concerns
compounded by valuation concerns, as opposed to liquidity concerns
standing alone - than does the installment sale statute. But there are
other statutes that provide nonrecognition treatment on arguably
broader grounds even than the installment sale statute. Thus, if H's
asset X is "qualified small business" stock, H may defer the
recognition of gain from a cash sale of X so long as H expeditiously
reinvests his sales proceeds in other qualified small business stock.33
33

See I.R.C. § 1045(a). Qualified small business stock is defined in section
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Transaction Type

Lack of Liquidity

Hard to Value

Installment Sale

Yes
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Like-Kind Exchange
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Rollover

No

No

It is difficult to argue that this provision has anything to do with
sound tax policy; it was presumably enacted for the benefit of private
equity firms and other such generally legislatively neglected folks.
Nonetheless, its specific carrot - deferral of realized gain - is one
that begs for justification, since its impact depends entirely on the
existence and the magnitude of H's realized gain. If the underlying
theory is neither illiquidity (H sold X for cash) nor the possible
imprecision of the measurement of gain (H sold X for cash), what is
it? The answer, which will make its appearance again, albeit in an
arguably more principled way when I return to the corporate
reorganization context, is that H should not be taxed on his gain with
respect to X because such gain represents nothing more than "paper
profits." That is, H may yet lose some or all of such gain if his
subsequent investment performs sufficiently poorly! So phrased, this
theory has no logical limit short of a conversion of the income tax into
a consumption or cash-flow tax; that is, the theory applies equally well
to any cash sale of any asset so long as the proceeds are reinvested in
any alternative asset.
Finally, if H's asset X is indeed "qualified small business" stock,
how are H's additional investment returns likely to differ as a result of
selling such stock and reinvesting the proceeds in other qualified small
business stock? The answer to that question lies above; the question is
identical to that obtained in the like-kind exchange context.34

1202(c). I.R.C. § 1202(c). Note that in addition to section 1045, there is a second
provision that allows H to defer recognition of gain from a sale of stock, provided that
H expeditiously and correctly reinvests his proceeds. Section 1044 allows H to defer
recognition of gain from the sale of publicly traded stock, so long as he reinvests his
sales proceeds in a "specialized small business investment company." Unfortunately,
the amount of gain that can be deferred under this provision is only $50,000 in any
given year, and so is not of interest to H. I.R.C. § 1044.
M This assumes that the investment characteristics of the assets
X and Y have
not changed. For example, asset X is stock in which H has a tax basis of $0 and that
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IV. A TALE OF TWO CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS (CONTINUED)
Before examining the question of whether there is anything
special about corporate mergers and acquisitions that justifies treating
them either more favorably or more harshly than other transactions
that are (assuming the statutory prerequisites are met) granted
nonrecognition treatment, it is worthwhile to examine how
Acquisitions #1 and #2 compare, purely in terms of additional
investment returns, with the transactions discussed immediately
above.
A. Acquisition #1
I assume that but for the purchase of X stock by GE, X would
have produced investment returns for H that are identical to those
described for the like-named asset X in the prior part of this article.
That is, H's X stock represents all of the equity of a corporation that
has assets valued at $3 million and liabilities of $2 million. I assume
that X's assets, over the relevant three-year time horizon, would have
generated sufficient current cash flow to exactly provide both the
lender and H with a 10% annual return, taking the assets' terminal
cash flow into account. 35 At the end of three years, the assets would
have generated a single terminal random cash flow that with equal
probability would have been anywhere between $1 million and $5
million. Thus, 25% of the time, H's unrealized gain of $1 million
would have evaporated (since the assets' terminal cash flow of less
than or equal to $2 million would have been entirely dedicated to
repaying liabilities). The remaining 75% of the time, H would have
received an additional capital-gain-type return with respect to his X
stock that, with equal probability, would have been anywhere between
-100% and +200%. H's expected additional "capital gain" would have
been +12.5 %.
How shall I model the investment returns from owning GE's
stock? Given both GE's size and the diversity of its businesses, it is
unrealistic to even pretend that such returns will look anything like
those of the asset Y in the prior part of this article. Thus, I assume that
GE's $1 trillion worth of assets will produce a terminal gross return
has a fair value of $1 million. In turn, X owns assets with a fair value of $3 million but
which are subject to liabilities of $2 million. And similarly for Y.
35 Specifically, the assets would have generated $300,000 of annual cash at the
end of the first, second, and third year. H would have received a dividend of $62,235
and the lender would have received interest of $237,765.

2007]

Taxation of Reorganizations

47

that, with equal probability, lies anywhere between $850 billion and
$1.25 trillion. Thus, an initial investment of $1 million in GE stock
may fall in value to $625,000, or rise in value to $1.625 million, or do
anything in between. It follows that H receives an additional capitalgain-type return that, with equal probability, lies anywhere between 37.5% and +62.5%. H's expected additional "capital gain" is +12.5%.
Finally, for ease of mathematical exposition, I begin with the
simplifying assumption that the terminal values of X and GE are
uncorrelated. (Since X's assets are now a part of GE's overall asset
base, this cannot literally be true. However, I can safely ignore the
effects of X's assets on GE's returns as they will be clearly
immaterial.) Under this admittedly extreme assumption, H's
additional investment return after selling his X stock to GE will be
within 10% of what such return would have been had he not made
such sale only approximately 6% of the time.
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Of course, even though X's assets and GE's assets are very
different, the returns from such assets are likely to be somewhat,
albeit less than perfectly, correlated. Accordingly, and again for ease
of mathematical exposition, I will make the opposite simplifying
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assumption, namely that the terminal values of X and GE are
perfectly correlated. Under this also admittedly extreme (but polar
opposite) assumption, H's additional investment return after selling
his X stock to GE will be within 10% of what such return would have
been had he not made such sale only approximately 6.7% of the time.

Given a more realistic assumption of partial but not complete
correlation, a result in between those presented above would be
produced. Whatever such intermediate result, however, H's additional
investment returns realized as a result of the sale of X to GE will
differ materially from what such returns would have been had he not
sold X to GE.
B. Acquisition #2
Whereas it would have been highly unrealistic to model GE's
investment returns on those of asset Y in the prior part of this article,
it is not at all unrealistic to model RUC's returns on the returns of
such asset. After all, RUC is relatively small and highly undiversified.
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Thus, I assume that prior to its combination with X, RUC's assets
were like asset Y. To wit, such assets had a fair value of $5 million and
were acquired subject to liabilities in the amount of $4 million. Over
the relevant three year time horizon, RUC's assets would have
generated sufficient current cash flow to exactly provide both its
lenders and its shareholders with a 10% annual return. At the end of
three years, RUC's assets would have produced a single terminal
random cash flow that, with equal probability, would have been
anywhere between $0 and $8.33 million. Thus, 48% of the time,
RUC's shareholders would have been wiped out (since the assets'
terminal cash flow of less than or equal to $4 million would have been
entirely dedicated to repaying RUC's lenders). The remaining 52% of
the time, RUC's shareholders would have received a capital-gain-type
return that, with equal probability, would have been anywhere
between -100% and +333%. The expected "capital gain" would have
been +12.5%.
How does X's combination with RUC affect H's investment
performance? To measure the change, I must combine the gross
returns from X's pre-combination assets and the gross returns from
RUC's pre-combination assets. For ease of mathematical exposition, I
will perform such combination under the simplifying assumption that
the terminal values of X's assets and RUC's assets are uncorrelated.
Under this admittedly extreme assumption, H's additional investment
return after the combination of X and RUC will be within 10% of
what such return would have been had the combination not been
consummated only approximately 17.7% of the time (with nearly 80%
of such overlap arising in situations where both X and RUC are
worthless, since their liabilities exceed the fair value of their assets).

[Vol. 27:23
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Of course, the returns from X's and RUC's assets are actually
likely to be rather well correlated, given that the assets are of a very
similar type. Accordingly, and again for ease of mathematical
exposition, I now make the opposite simplifying assumption, namely
that the terminal values of X's and RUC's assets are perfectly
correlated. Under this also admittedly extreme (but polar opposite)
assumption, H's additional investment return after the combination of
X and RUC will be within 10% of what such return would have been
had the combination not been consummated approximately 36.8% of
the time (with nearly 75% of such overlap arising in situations where
both X and RUC are worthless, since their liabilities exceed the fair
value of their assets).
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Given a more realistic assumption of partial but not complete
correlation, a result in between those presented above would be
produced. Whatever such intermediate result, however, H's additional
investment returns realized as a result of the combination of X and
RUC will differ materially from what such returns would have been
but for the combination.
C. Summary
As can be seen from Table 3 below, Acquisitions #1 and #2 are
not, in terms of their economic characteristics, beyond the pale of
exchanges that routinely garner nonrecognition treatment. Indeed,
under this criterion, Acquisition #1 is marginally more deserving of
nonrecognition treatment than is an installment sale of the very same
asset, and Acquisition #2 is marginally more deserving of
nonrecognition treatment than would be a like-kind exchange or a
qualified stock rollover of the very same asset (were such a transaction
possible).
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TABLE 3.

Transaction Type
Installment Sale
Acquisition #1
Like-Kind Exchange
Qualified Stock Rollover
Acquisition #2

Returns within 10%
5%
6.0% to 6.7%
15.3% to 32.3%
15.3% to 32.3%
17.7% to 36.8%

This is hardly a ringing endorsement for granting Acquisitions #1
and #2 nonrecognition treatment. It would arguably be best to simply
eliminate such treatment for all of the listed transactions.3 6 However,
if nonrecognition treatment for the installment sale and the like-kind
exchange (and the qualified stock rollover) are not going to be
eliminated (and my belief is that it is not going to be eliminated any
time soon), then, unless one has no qualms about incrementally
discriminating against the more common run of investments made in
corporate form in favor primarily of investments made in
noncorporate form (and one should have such qualms since the entire
apparatus of double taxation already discriminates against
investments made in corporate form), some other justification must be
found to exclude one or both of Acquisitions #1 and #2 from the
nonrecognition club.
Fortunately
(or perhaps unfortunately),
the traditional
justifications for granting nonrecognition treatment to a transaction
apply with about as much force to Acquisitions #1 and #2 as they
apply to noncorporate nonrecognition transactions. This is illustrated
in Table 4 below. Based on those justifications, Acquisition #2 makes
a strong case for nonrecognition treatment, very much in line with the
case made by a classic like-kind exchange. Further, while Acquisition
#1's case for nonrecognition treatment is quite weak, it is no weaker
(and in Variant 1A marginally stronger, since H never actually has
cash in his hands) than the case made by a qualified stock rollover.

36

Kornhauser, supra note 30, at 448; Shaviro, supra note 16, at 66.
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TABLE 4.

Transaction
Type

Lack of Liquidity

Hard to Value

Mr Paper
ae
MeProfit

Like-Kind
Exchange

Yes

Yes

Yes

Acquisition #2

Yes

Yes

Yes

Installment Sale

Yes

No

Yes

Qualified Stock
Rollover

No

No

Yes

Acquisition #1

No

No

Yes

...

I am not unmindful of one possibly vocal objection to the
premises underlying the foregoing Table 4. Is it not the case that what
is and what is not blessed in the Code is largely or even purely a
question of political whim? Put differently, is not the political clout of
the real estate industry the best explanation for why like-kind
exchanges receive nonrecognition treatment, or at least for why it is so
much easier to qualify real estate exchanges under section 1031 than it
is to qualify exchanges of personal property? And is not the political
clout of the investment community, or perhaps Congress' sincere
desire to help spur small business formation, the best explanation for
the qualified stock rollover provision?
While I agree that these observations have some (perhaps even
considerable) explanatory power in delineating the contours of
various nonrecognition provisions, I think they provide little of the
philosophical justification for the actual existence of such provisions.
Thus, "the principal congressional objective in allowing [the
installment] method is to provide relief from the harshness of an
obligation to pay taxes when the taxpayer has not received cash with
which to pay those taxes."37 Furthermore, the congressional concerns
leading to enactment and retention of the like-kind exchange
provision were squarely valuation-based: "If all exchanges were made
taxable, it would be necessary to [value] the property received in
exchange in thousands of horse trades and similar barter transactions
each year."38
Since nonrecognition treatment can be justified for certain classes
KLEIN, BANKMAN & SHAVIRO, supra note
25.
38 H.R. REP. No. 704, at 12-13 (1934), cited and discussed in Kornhauser,
supra
37

note 30, at 400-07.
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of corporate reorganizations and other acquisitions along these same

philosophical lines, and as will become clear below, not only along
these lines but along other lines as well, it follows that absent some
particularly good (political or other) reason to exclude such classes of
corporate reorganizations and other acquisitions from nonrecognition
treatment, they should be granted such treatment.
V. THE HISTORIC RATIONALES FOR THE NONTAXATION OF
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS

The corporate reorganization provisions, broadly defined as Part
III of Subchapter C of the Code, bestow nonrecognition treatment

upon certain parties to certain mergers, acquisitions, and other
corporate transactions, and of particular relevance to this article,

delineate the extent of nonrecognition treatment to be enjoyed by a
human shareholder H who exchanges his X corporation stock for

stock, securities, or other consideration as a result of a merger,
acquisition, or similar transaction involving X. They entered the Code
by way of the Revenue Act of 1918. 39 Although the legislative history

of the original statute is sparse, what there is of it indicates a desire on
the part of Congress to provide nonrecognition treatment in
circumstances involving "purely paper transactions.,

40

Unfortunately,

it was as unclear in 1918 as it is today
what exactly is meant by the
41
phrase "purely paper transaction.",
Congress immediately and frequently 43 set to work clarifying the
39 The definition was initially set forth in section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of
1918. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1918).
40 Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and HistoricalRealism, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1, 14

(2000) (quoting S. REP. No. 65-617, at 5 (1918)); Jerome R. Hellerstein, Mergers,
Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARV. L. REV. 254, 258 (1957) (quoting S. REP. No. 65-617, at
5 (1918)).
41 See Brauner, supra note 13, at 52-53 (discussing the Supreme
Court's
wrestling with this basic issue in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); United
States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921); and Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924)).
42 A new section was added in the Revenue Act of 1921. Revenue Act of
1921,
Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227,230 (1921).
43 The Revenue Act of 1924 again altered the reorganization definition and
moved it to section 203(h)(1). Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, § 203(h)(1),
43 Stat. 253, 257 (1924). Additional changes were ushered in by the Revenue Acts of
1928, 1932, and 1934, which ultimately relocated the reorganization definition to
section 112(g). These and subsequent changes from the early years of the federal
income tax can best be tracked in J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS: 1938-1861 (1938) and J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAWS: 1953-
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corporate reorganization definition. It ultimately succeeded only in
making the definition incredibly and most (including me) would argue
pointlessly complicated. But it never did much in the way of providing
a raison d'etre. Thus, notably, the most famous elaboration of a raison
d'etre is one official's unofficial pronouncement, famously broadcast
in the New York Times. A.W. Gregg, a special assistant to Treasury
Secretary Andrew Mellon, stated that the purpose of the
reorganization provisions was to ensure that exchanges involving
"merely changes in form and not in substance" should not be taxed.44
Both the "purely paper transactions" language and the "merely
changes in form and not in substance" language are open to a very
natural and very narrow interpretation. Under this interpretation,
Congress did not intend to add any taxpayer benefit not already
provided by the underlying constitutional tax law (as understood by
Congress). That constitutional tax law limited income taxation to
income that was realized. Congress may have believed, but may have
feared that the Commissioner and the courts would not similarly
believe, that some purely paper transactions and mere changes in
form did not amount to realization. Accordingly, it enacted the
reorganization provisions as a sort of insurance policy, a backstop to
the Constitution. Was Congress just being paranoid? As it turns out,
it was not. The Commissioner and certain Justices on the Supreme
Court did indeed ultimately take a much narrower view of what did
and what did not amount to realization.
For example, in Eisner v. Macomber, Justices Brandeis and
Holmes attempted, unsuccessfully, to persuade their colleagues that
the ultimate purely paper transaction, the mere splitting of a
46
corporation's stock, should constitute a (taxable) realization event.
And in Marr v. United States, Justice Brandeis, now writing for the
majority, stated that a New Jersey corporation's reincorporation as a
Delaware corporation was a (taxable) realization event because "a
corporation organized under the laws of Delaware does not have the

1939 (1954) [hereinafter SEIDMAN, 1953-1939].
Bank, supra note 40, at 15 (quoting A.W. Gregg, Statement of the Changes in
the Revenue Act of 1921 by the Treasury Draft and the Reasons Therefor (1924),
reprinted in Treasury Expert Explains Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1924, at 1);
Hellerstein, supra note 40, at 258 (also quoting A.W. Gregg, Statement of the Changes
in the Revenue Act of 1921 by the Treasury Draft and the Reasons Therefor (1924),
reprinted in Treasury Expert Explains Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1924, at 1).
45 See Bank, supra note 40, at 43-78; see also ALI PROJECT, supra note 18, at
155.
4 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 27:23

same rights and powers as one organized under the laws of New

Jersey.,47 1 very much doubt that he could have found a single human
shareholder,

then

or

now,

who

would

characterize

such

a

reincorporation as anything other than the merest change in form.48
But while the genesis of the reorganization provisions may well
have been simply to bolster the realization principal, their effect was
always much more. Thus, they have always applied to a wide swath of
transactions that, while they may solely involve exchanges of paper

and thus linguistically constitute "purely paper transactions," are
surely much more than "merely changes in form and not in
substance.,

49

If there is a valid principal, economic or otherwise, that

unites these favored transactions, Congress has never seen fit to
announce it. And that has left it up to commentators and courts to fill
the breach. Not surprisingly, many of these have posited the

justifications, briefly discussed in the prior part, that also apply in noncorporate acquisition contexts.
The first justification, adapted from the like-kind exchange

context, is valuation difficulty. ° In certain corporate acquisitions, such
as Acquisition #2, such difficulty may actually exist. But for many

acquisitions that fall squarely within the corporate reorganization
definition, including Acquisition #1, the notion of valuation difficulty
is a joke. The second, adapted from the installment sale context, is
insufficient liquidity to allow the taxpayer to pay his tax.5" Again, in
certain corporate acquisitions, such as Acquisition #2, such difficulty
47 Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 541 (1925). Marr has been statutorily

corrected. A reincorporation now qualifies as a tax-free reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(F). I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F).
48 Phrased somewhat differently, no human shareholder in his capacity as
a
shareholder is likely to care about the identity of the state of incorporation.
Corporate managers may care, but in their capacity as managers, rather than as
shareholders.
49 See generally BORIS I. BrITKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME

12.01[3] (7th ed. 2000).
See, e.g., Brauner, supra note 13, at 12. This is ultimately a problem for
reasons of efficient tax administration. Thus, in the case of an exchange of properties
that are not readily traded, one can imagine significant expenditures on appraisals and
the like caused by the fact that the taxpayer will inevitably view the properties as
being of little value while the Service will inevitably the properties as being of great
value. Given this waste of resources, one could argue that it may be simpler and more
equitable to simply defer taxation.
51 See, e.g., ALl PROJECT, supra note 18, at 157; Brauner, supra note 13, at 13. In
order for this to be a problem, two things must be true: the asset received by the
taxpayer must itself be illiquid and the taxpayer must have no separate store of liquid
assets with which to pay any tax on his gain.
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
50
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may actually exist. But for many acquisitions that fall squarely within
the corporate reorganization definition, including Acquisition #1,
there is no illiquidity. Moreover, even where liquidity is a valid
concern, mechanisms could be enacted to allow the Treasury to
effectively lend the taxpayer the cash with which to pay his tax."
A third justification, adapted to the reorganization context from
the realization context, and thus arguably more in tune with the
genesis of the reorganization provisions, is that most taxpayers think it
is grossly unfair to be taxed on gain from an investment prior to their
disposition of such investment." In large part this is because what goes
up may also come down: an unrealized gain might evaporate prior to
the asset's disposition. Of course, the very same argument can be
made in a reinvestment context (and would need to be made to
provide Acquisition #1B with nonrecognition treatment): if H sells X
for cash and reinvests his proceeds in Y (or GE), he might suffer a loss
in Y (or GE) that offsets some or all of his prior (taxed) gain in X.
However, while perceptions of unfairness are strong against imposing
a tax in the investment context, they are not generally similarly strong
against imposing a tax in the reinvestment context.
The realization or fairness justification may be adapted to the
corporate acquisition context by asking the question: When will a
taxpayer view both his original X stock and the consideration he
receives in exchange for such X stock as constituting a single
investment? While there may be no universal answer to this question,
attempts at answers explain at least some of the contours of the
current reorganization provisions.54 For example, the Treasury itself
has asserted (albeit without historical support) that it is the fairness
justification that lies at the bottom of a host of nonrecognition
provisions, including specifically the corporate reorganization
provisions: "The underlying assumption of [the corporate
reorganization provisions] is... that the new enterprise, the new
corporate structure, and the new property are substantially
continuations of the old still unliquidated."55 And it has further
elaborated, albeit with a narrowing caveat: "The purpose of the
reorganization provisions of the Code is to except from the general
rule [of income recognition] certain specifically described

52 See I.R.C. § 453A.

See, e.g., Brauner, supra note 13, at 16. Of course, if current law were
otherwise, it is conceivable that this perception would be different.
" See, e.g., ALI PROJEcT, supra note 18, at 158.
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1960).
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exchanges ... which effect only a readjustment of continuing interest
in property under modified corporate forms. 5 6 In other words, the
taxpayer still owns his original investment.
But what does it mean for H's consideration to be substantially a
continuation of his X stock (per the first quote), or a continuing
interest in his X stock under a modified corporate form (per the
second quote)? The tautological answer, supported by the narrowing
caveat (emphasized by my added italics) in the second quote, is: it
means whatever section 368 says it means. But given the
inconsistencies found in current law, that answer is as unprincipled as
it is unhelpful. The better answer, I think, is that H must at a
minimum continue to possess an ownership interest, however indirect
and attenuated, in at least some of the former assets or business of X.
Such a requirement has in fact been implemented by the so-called
"continuity of business enterprise" regulations, albeit as one of many
requirements for nonrecognition treatment rather than as a be-alland-end-all. 7 Note that as a be-all-and-end-all, it would not serve to
distinguish between Acquisitions #1 and #2. In each, H retains an
indirect and either greatly or8 somewhat attenuated interest in the
former assets or business of X.1
VI. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROPOSAL AND OTHER
ACADEMIC PROPOSALS

Among proposals to rationalize the taxation of reorganizations
and other corporate acquisitions, the best known is surely the
American Law Institute's ProposalD1 - Exchange of Stock for Stock
of an Acquiring Corporationpursuant to which H would not be taxed

either in Acquisition #1A (he would, however, be taxed in Acquisition
#1B) or in Acquisition #2:
No gain or loss shall be recognized by any noncorporate
shareholder if stock of an acquired corporation is, in

56 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (2007) (emphasis added).
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (2007). In addition, the reform proposal

D1
recommended by the ALI essentially takes this approach. See ALl PROJECT, supra
note 18, at 167.
58 The ALl Project included but did not recommend a proposal that would
distinguish between the two acquisitions, taxing only Acquisition #1. ALI PROJECT,
supra note 18, at 159-63, 182.
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pursuance of the plan of acquisition, exchanged solely for
59
stock of one or more acquiring corporations."
There is a curious aspect to the ALI's proposal. Its grant of
nonrecognition treatment is not premised on any single unifying
theme, such as concern about valuation or taxpayer liquidity or the
unfairness of taxing a substantial continuation of an investment. To be6
sure, each of these potential justifications is mentioned, as are others. 0
And much is also made of the unnecessary complexity of the law. 61
But in the end, the reader is left with the sense that the overriding
reason why the ALI recommended keeping a nonrecognition
provision in the context of corporate acquisitions is historical: the
Code has contained such a provision almost since the inception of the
income tax.
Given this non-reason for continuing nonrecognition treatment,
albeit in some modified and vastly simplified form, it is not surprising
that academic commentators have not in general rallied behind the
ALI's proposal. Perhaps the most withering attack on nonrecognition
treatment came from David Shakow, who proposed a tax system in
which all mergers and acquisitions are fully taxed (immediately, and
twice).6 ' His justification was primarily simplification. He saw no
significant countervailing consideration: "Reducing the number of
nonrecognition provisions generally simplifies the application of the
Code by narrowing the area in which complicated tax planning can go
59 See ALI PROJECT, supra note 18, at 167.
60 Id. at 155-59. One additional potential justification is that a grant of
nonrecognition treatment may remove an impediment to business transactions that
areotherwise desirable. This is an efficiency argument: nonrecognition treatment can
be used to overcome the so-called lock-in effect. It is worth noting that scholars are
now quite skeptical of this argument. See Brauner, supra note 13, at 17-49; Shaviro,
supra note 16, at 55-58. Another potential justification is that reorganizations are
primarily corporate transactions, rather than shareholder transactions. This argument
has two forms. First, reorganizations can often be carried out without the consent of
and indeed over the objection of individual shareholders. In such cases, it is unfair to
tax the shareholder on an involuntarily realized gain. Second, a corporate
reorganization or other acquisition is not a necessary prerequisite to the complete
divestiture of a shareholder's interest in a corporation's businesses: the corporation
can simply sell all of its businesses and enter into new businesses; the shareholder is
not taxed because he did not sell, exchange or otherwise dispose of his shares. If such
a complete divestiture is possible without the imposition of a shareholder-level tax,
then why should lesser divestitures of the sort that arise in reorganization contexts
lead to recognition?
61 Id. at 155, 163-67.
62 David J. Shakow, Wither, "C"!, 45 TAx L. REV. 177 (1990).
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such a change
on. Accordingly, transactions should be taxable unless
63
will substantially restrict normal economic activity.,
Just as it is relatively easy to design a generally consistent tax
regime that places a heavy thumb on the scales in favor of
nonrecognition, it is relatively easy to design a generally consistent tax
regime that places a heavy thumb on the scales in favor of recognition.
The former type of regime must be grounded on a proposal very like
that of the ALI: it will necessarily grant nonrecognition treatment to
any shareholder who exchanges target corporation stock for
purchasing corporation stock because such shareholder would have
received nonrecognition treatment (albeit as the result of the lack of
realization) had the acquisition instead been structured as the
acquisition of the purchasing corporation by the target corporation.
(Acquisitions #2A and #2B illustrate the ease with which corporations
that are parties to an acquisition can reverse roles.)
The latter type of regime, meanwhile, would probably approach
mark-to-market taxation. The reason can be illustrated by reference
to Acquisition #1. If the Code is bereft of corporate reorganization
provisions, then H is taxed when GE acquires H's X stock in exchange
for GE stock. But consistency then demands that H must be taxed
even if the transaction is restructured so that X acquires all of GE's
stock in exchange for newly issued X stock (the classic example of a
minnow swallowing a whale). But in the absence of any corporate
reorganization provisions, such an acquisition of GE by X would
result in all of GE's shareholders being taxed. It then follows that such
shareholders must be taxed even if GE acquires X.
Thus, a tax regime that entirely abolishes anything like the
corporate reorganization provisions and also insists on consistency
must tax all of the shareholders of both the target corporation and the
purchasing corporation, at least in the case of an acquisition making
use of stock as consideration. Accordingly, under such a tax regime,
stock acquisitions would never occur - GE's shareholders would not
stand for being taxed every time GE made a stock acquisition,
however small - unless they did not recognize any incremental gain
as a result of such acquisition. The only way that they uniformly would
not recognize any incremental gain would be that they have no
incremental gain to recognize. And that, in turn, would only be
possible if they have already recognized all of their gain, even in the
absence of a stock acquisition. The tax regime that ensures that they
have indeed recognized all of their gain, even in the absence of a stock
63

Id. at 191.
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acquisition, is mark-to-market taxation. The realization principle, in
other words, would be dead.
While Shakow is no fan of nonrecognition treatment, he does not
base his corporate reorganization reform proposal on a wholesale
abandonment of the realization principle.64 Rather, he chooses to
occupy an intermediate position, making some but not all corporate
reorganizations and other acquisitions taxable. To occupy such a
position, and yet satisfy the demands of consistency, Shakow seeks
robust definitions of what constitutes a target corporation and what
constitutes a purchasing corporation. Once those robust definitions
are in hand, he gives them consequences. The consequence of being
the target is that the target's pre-transaction shareholders are taxed on
all of the gain or loss with respect to their target stock; the
consequence of being the purchaser is that the purchaser's pretransaction shareholders are not taxed on any of the gain or loss with
respect to their purchaser stock. 61
How does Shakow robustly identify the target and the purchaser?
He looks to post-transaction ownership. If a corporation's equity
ownership has changed by more than 50% (which must be true for
one and only one of the two corporations involved in any
reorganization or other corporate acquisition, except in the unusual
case in which each corporation's equity ownership changes by exactly
66
50%), such corporation is treated as the target. If a corporation's
equity ownership has changed by less than 50%, such corporation is
treated as the purchaser.
Thus, in Shakow's model, H would be taxed on Acquisition #1
whether it is structured as an acquisition of X by GE (as it is under
either Variant 1A or Variant 1B) or even as an acquisition of GE by
X. And H would not be taxed in Acquisition #2, whether it is
structured as in Variant 2A as an acquisition of X by RUC or as in
Variant 2B as an acquisition of RUC by X, since, in either case, preacquisition X and RUC shareholders will each own exactly 50% of the
64 He does make that argument elsewhere, however. See Shakow, supra note 13.

Id. at 194-95. Note that since Shakow is also concerned about taxation at the
corporate level, he uses this very same criterion to determine which of the two
corporations (if either) is taxed on the gain or loss with respect to its assets. Id. at 195.
66 Id. at 194-95. While not stated in the clearest of terms, it would appear that
Shakow would also treat a corporation as a target if more than 50% of its assets
change in a relatively short time frame. See id. at 195. Thus, for example, if a
corporation sells just over 50% of its assets and reinvests the proceeds in a new
business, Shakow would treat the corporation's shareholders as having disposed of
their stock in a taxable transaction. See id.
65
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equity of the surviving corporation. Finally, note that for Shakow,
everything turns solely on the question of which corporation is the
target and which is the purchaser; nothing at all turns on such
historically critical notions as valuation, liquidity, and the like.
More recently, Yariv Brauner has argued for doing away with
nonrecognition treatment in the context of reorganizations and other
corporate acquisitions. 6' Brauner notes that empirical evidence
supports the proposition that corporate acquisitions involving cash
consideration (and which are therefore taxable under current law) are
no less and probably actually more efficient (in the sense of wealthcreating) than corporate acquisitions involving stock consideration. 68
Indeed, the latter are likely not efficient (in the sense of wealthcreating) at all. If these propositions are correct, then current tax rules
are not inhibiting efficient transactions, but are likely encouraging
inefficient ones. At a minimum, they should cease doing the latter.
In order to ensure that the tax law does not favor corporate
acquisitions involving stock consideration, Brauner would repeal the
section 368 reorganization provisions. 6' Thus, every corporate
acquisition, however structured, would be taxable. Unfortunately, tax
would only be imposed on parties who experience a realization event,
since Brauner does not argue for repeal of the realization
requirement. 0 Thus, H would be taxed in Acquisition #1, whether
carried out by means of Variant 1A or Variant 1B (but not if carried
out by having X swallow GE). Moreover, H would be taxed in
Acquisition #2A, but not in Acquisition #2B, since the latter does not
produce a realization event for H. Note that Brauner, like Shakow,
would not allow tax results to depend on such niceties as valuation or
liquidity.

67

Brauner, supra note 13.

68 Id. at 47.
69

Id. at 50.

7I Id. at 51. In fairness, Brauner's avowed agreement with Shakow's
approach

means that he may well endorse such repeal, but he does not make such a grand
proposal in his article.
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TABLE

5. TAX ALTERNATIVES

Acquisition #1

Acquisition #2

Current
Law

Not taxable (A) and
taxable (B)

Taxable (A) and
not taxable (B)

Shakow

Taxable

Not taxable

Brauner

Taxabletabl(B

ALl
Project

Taxable (A) and not
taxable (B)

Not taxable (A) and
taxable (B)

Not taxable

If one is interested in serious tax reform, it is easy to dismiss
Brauner's proposal, since it does not satisfy the threshold consistency
requirement that substance rather than form should determine tax
consequences. Accordingly, parties would continue to expend
significant energy determining which form of transaction will result in
the least amount of tax. One could ask if it is possible to resurrect
Brauner's proposal. The answer has already been stated above. A
consistent tax regime that mandated recognition for corporate
reorganizations would need to repeal the realization principle at least
as currently applied to shareholders of corporations that acquire other
corporations in exchange for stock.
VII. CHOOSING FROM THE MENU OF CONSISTENT TAX
TREATMENTS

A. The Spectrum of Choices
From the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that there are a
number of consistent ways in which to tax corporate acquisitions or
combinations, and that these ways span a spectrum ranging from those
that generally favor nonrecognition treatment to those that generally
favor recognition treatment. The following table repeats the choices.
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TABLE 6. CONSISTENT TAX TREATMENTS

Tax Treatment

Acquisition #1

Acquisition #2

Nonrecognition if any
nonstock consideration is
reinvested in stock

Nontaxable

Nontaxable

Nontaxable (A)
and taxable (B)

Nontaxable

Nontaxable (A)
and taxable (B)

Nontaxable

Taxable (at 50%)

Nontaxable
(at 50%)

Taxable

Taxable

Gains already
taxed

Gains already
taxed

Nonrecognition if any
nonstock consideration is
reinvested in stock, but only
if such consideration is
involuntarily received
Nonrecognition if stock
consideration is received
(ALI)
Nonrecognition if
insufficient change in
effective ownership of
corporation's shares
(Shakow)
Recognition whenever
corporation engages in a
stock-based business
combination
Mark-to-market

The first three options in the table are all relatively permissive.
The most permissive option follows the general approach of the
qualified stock rollover: any shareholder who receives cash (or other
nonstock) consideration as a result of a corporate acquisition would
be entitled to nonrecognition treatment so long as he reinvested such
cash, during some suitably short window (e.g., sixty days), in any other
corporate stock of his choice. The next most permissive option follows
the general approach applied by the Code to involuntary
conversions,71 and thus allows a nonrecognition rollover of cash
consideration only when a shareholder is divested, against his will (as
generally manifested by his vote), of his corporate stock. The final and
least permissive of the permissive options is that of the ALl: a
shareholder is granted nonrecognition treatment so long as he
71

See I.R.C. § 1033.

2007]

Taxation of Reorganizations

receives consideration consisting solely of stock.
Note that I call each of these tax treatments "consistent," in spite

of the apparent inconsistency that can be seen in the first column of
the table. This is because such tax treatments are consistent so long as

one ascribes substantive significance to a shareholder's (even very
temporary) receipt of cash. Ascribing such substantive significance is
by no means irrational, since the even very temporary receipt of cash
opens the door to a wide array of investment and consumption
choices. Nonetheless, since it is possible that such inconsistency would
be exploited by taxpayers seeking to accelerate losses, it may be that
the most permissive option should be preferred as the one that is
"most consistent.,12 On the other hand, it is less than clear, at least in

the public company context, that any significant amount of
exploitation would occur."
The intermediate options, and there are an infinite continuum of
such options, follow Shakow. In essence, these options treat
diversification as a possible realization event, and hence as a possible
trigger for recognition. Shakow's actual proposal set the
diversification threshold at more than 50%: if as a result of a
corporate acquisition, one corporation's shareholders own less than a

50% equity interest in their corporation or the successor to their
corporation, they are taxed. But there is no necessary reason to set the
threshold at "more than 50%." Thus, one could as easily and as
coherently, albeit marginally more arbitrarily, set the threshold at, for
example, more than 40%: if as a result of a corporate acquisition, one
72

Note that even this option is not entirely consistent. However, it is not the

interposition of cash consideration, but rather the interposition of sufficient time prior
to reinvestment (e.g., sixty-one days), that would lead to recognition.
73 In the case of public companies, the decision of how to structure
a corporate
acquisition is generally made by a combination of the purchasing corporation and the
majority of shareholders of the target corporation. The purchasing corporation may
well prefer to pay cash since the use of cash has two distinct benefits. First, the use of
cash, whether or not there is attendant borrowing, allows the purchasing corporation
to expropriate cash flow otherwise headed to the Treasury. Second, the use of cash,
particularly if there is attendant borrowing, sends a less equivocal signal to the capital
markets than does the use of stock as to the purchasing corporation's assessment of
the benefits of the acquisition. Meanwhile, a majority of the shareholders of any
public target corporation are generally tax indifferent; they are either tax exempt
entities or mutual funds (which are able to pass their gains on to their shareholders).
These shareholders generally prefer to receive cash consideration, since cash is more
easily valued and more easily redeployed than is stock consideration. Thus, in the
public company context, considerations other than the tax posture of the human
shareholders of the target corporation are likely to determine the choice of cash or
stock consideration.
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corporation's shareholders own less than a 60% equity interest in
their corporation or the successor to their corporation, they are taxed.
Note that this modification would affect the taxation of Acquisition
#2: whereas H would not be taxed under Shakow's actual proposal, he
would be taxed under this modification.
Finally, one could, and probably should, modify Shakow's
measurement criterion to one that focuses on asset ownership rather
than equity ownership.74 That is, the true extent to which H has
modified his investment is not determined by post-combination equity
ownership, but rather by post-combination asset ownership. For
example, in Acquisition #2, although X's shareholders continue to
own a 50% equity interest in their pre-combination assets, their precombination assets only comprise 37.5% of the total value of their
post-combination investment. Thus, they have diversified their
investment by more than 50%. A rule based on assets might read as
follows: if as a result of a corporate acquisition, one corporation's
shareholders indirectly own assets of which less than 50% constitute
pre-acquisition assets, they will be taxed. Under this rule, H would be
taxed in Acquisition #2, however structured.
Moving out of the realm of intermediate options and into that of
pro-recognition options, the first possibility would be essentially
Brauner's proposal made consistent by taxing not only those parties to
a corporate acquisition who experience a classic realization event but
also those parties to a corporate acquisition who do not. Thus, for
example, in Acquisition #1, not only would H be taxed, but so would
all of GE's shareholders. Such a rule, while consistent, could be
expected to bring to a screeching halt all corporate acquisition activity
making use of stock as consideration. The GEs of the world would
simply not be able to foist such recognition on their shareholders.
Thus, any attempt to move to the full recognition rule should at least
lead one to consider a further move to mark-to-market taxation.
Under such a regime, corporate acquisitions making use of stock as
consideration could once again proceed unimpeded by tax
considerations. Since all gains and losses would be realized and
recognized as they occur, an actual corporate acquisition would not
lead to incremental taxation of either the target corporation's or the
purchasing corporation's shareholders.

74

Shakow more or less acknowledges this. See Shakow, supra note 62, at 195-96.
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B. Intermediate Options

Intermediate options have two features that recommend them.
First, by taking only part of a loaf, they necessarily leave part of a loaf.
The true believer in nonrecognition will deprecate the taking, but will
find a tad of solace in the leaving. The true believer in full and
immediate recognition will do the opposite. But it is at least possible
that each will rally behind an intermediate option if it is sufficiently
clear that their preferred extreme option is unlikely to be adopted.
Second, intermediate options have the aura of scientific precision
about them. In Shakow's version, it is possible, at least under certain
sets of facts, to say with precision that one corporation is the target,
that the other is the purchaser, and that those categories are
independent of the actual corporate machinations. In a more
generalized version, it is theoretically possible to say that a
shareholder's investment represented by his shares of a corporation's
stock has been altered by z%. If the alteration is sufficiently great, it is
proper for the tax law to treat the shareholder as now owning shares
in a new and different corporation, and thus as having engaged in an
exchange of the original shares for the new shares.
Of course, applying intermediate options may prove difficult in
practice. If all relevant corporations have only shares of common
stock outstanding, it is easy to measure the impact of a corporate
acquisition on the original shareholders' interest in their corporation's
underlying assets. For example, in Acquisition #1, the shareholders of
X (i.e., H) owned 100% of the shares of X before its combination with
GE, and own 0.00025% of GE's shares after the combination. Thus,
such shareholders' participation in X's original assets falls by an
objectively measurable 99.99975% from 100% to 0.00025%.
But what if the corporations involved in the business combination
have multiple classes of stock outstanding, each with different
entitlements? In this case, Shakow's apparently objective focus on
group ownership becomes problematic for at least two reasons. The
first is that such focus does not, in fact, eradicate the relevance of
transactional form. The second is that it may make valuation
questions, which are all but unanswerable, determine the tax outcome.
To see how transactional form could change the tax results in
Acquisition #2, suppose that the transaction proceeds essentially as in
Variant 2B, but with the following changes. First, X does not borrow
any money from Bank, and accordingly does not engage in a
recapitalization. However, X does amend its charter to provide that
the Class A and the Class B stock will henceforth each be entitled to

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 27:23

only a single vote per share. Thus, at the time of the merger of RUC
with and into X, X continues to have 500,000 shares of Class A
Common Stock (now having one vote per share) and 500,000 shares of
Class B Common Stock outstanding. The merger takes place as
before, with each share of RUC being exchanged for one share of X's
Class B Common Stock. Thus, after the merger, X's original
shareholders own all 500,000 shares of X's Class A Common Stock
and 500,000 out of 1.5 million shares of X's Class B Common Stock.
Note that so long as the Class A Common Stock's liquidation
preference stays "in the money," there is no significant difference
between the economics of this transaction and the economics of the
original Acquisition #2. For example, after waiting a suitable period of
time, X's Class A Common Stock could be recapitalized as in the
original Acquisition #2, thus exactly restoring the economics of the
original structure.
How would Shakow's scheme tax this new variant? Let me
stipulate that the post-combination fair values of the Class A and
Class B Common Stock are $50 per share and $10 per share,
respectively. If so, then X's original shareholders own 75% of the
post-merger corporation, and RUC's original shareholders own the
remaining 25%. In other words, X has become the purchasing
corporation and RUC has become the target corporation.
Accordingly, Shakow would not tax the original shareholders of X,
but would tax the original shareholders RUC. Form, it turns out,
matters very much indeed!
The second problem, which is admittedly not a problem of theory
but merely of administration, arises from the difficulty of valuing
stock in the absence of public equity markets. For example, consider
the following variation of Acquisition #2. Suppose that X has among
its assets the rights to drill for oil on a patch of land called Parcel V.
X's shareholders believe that Parcel V will be particularly lucrative,
but RUC's shareholders are somewhat skeptical. Further, suppose
that RUC has among its assets the rights to drill for oil on a patch of
land called Parcel W. R UC's shareholders believe that Parcel W will
be particularly lucrative, but X's shareholders are somewhat skeptical.
Under these facts, a business combination between X and RUC
(which might still make an extraordinary amount of sense due to
factors such as cost savings, diversification of projects, etc.) might
proceed along the general lines of Acquisition #2A, but with the
following modifications. RUC amends its charter to provide for two
classes of common stock. The first class, called Class W, entitles its
owners to a modest preferred return based on a fraction of the net
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cash generated by Parcel W, and otherwise entitles them to participate
equally with owners of all other classes of RUC common stock in all
other distributions and liquidation proceeds. The second class, called
Class V, entitles its owners to a modest preferred return based on a
fraction of the net cash generated by Parcel V, and otherwise entitles
them to participate equally with owners of all other classes of RUC
common stock in all other distributions and liquidation proceeds.
Once the charter has been amended, X merges with and into RUC.
The original owners of RUC's common stock exchange each share for
one new share of Class W Common Stock. Finally, X's Class A
Common Stock owners exchange each share for $40 in cash and one
new share of Class V Common Stock; X's Class B Common Stock
owners exchange each share for one new share of Class V Common
Stock.
Confronted with these facts, how would Shakow's tax regime
respond? Is X the purchasing corporation? Its original shareholders
clearly think so. But RUC's original shareholders just as clearly think
that X is the target corporation. The Commissioner, predictably, will
argue that X and RUC are each target corporations. Intractable
valuation questions have thus been elevated to tax outcome
determinative status. That can't be good.
Two questions must be answered before surrendering all hope in
intermediate options. First, are the infirmities identified above likely
to be sufficiently important to matter? Second, are there ways to
modify the Shakow-style intermediate option that do not suffer from
the same infirmities?
The first question is largely empirical. As an empirical matter, I
concede that the problem, at least in the public company context, is
unlikely to be significant. In that context, which admittedly is
Shakow's focus (in large part because it is the only context in which
valuation issues are not insuperable), corporations with multiple
classes of stock exist, but are in the distinct minority. Moreover, in
vanishingly few of the corporate combinations involving corporations
with multiple classes of stock are such multiple classes likely to cast
any doubt on the identity of the target corporation and the purchasing
corporation.
Nonetheless, a robust tax regime should be concerned not only
with the public company context, but also with the private company
context. Anecdotal evidence based on my prior life in practice
suggests that multiple classes of stock are quite common in the context
of private companies. Moreover, the same anecdotal evidence
suggests that shareholders transacting in the private company context

70
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are far more amenable to complicating their corporate capital
structures with multiple classes of stock if such complications produce
desired tax savings. Perhaps this is as it should be. Perhaps it is socially
desirable to allow private company shareholders a wider latitude for
avoiding recognition than public company shareholders. After all,
these are the fabled small businessmen, the principals of venture
capital and private equity firms, and so on, who are surely the actors
in the economy who are the most responsive to tax incentives. These
are also the same individuals who so disproportionately populate the
upper classes. It therefore seems to me that a policy debate beyond
the scope of this article (and beyond the scope of Shakow's article as
well) is necessary before pronouncing that a problem of multiple
classes of stock is insignificant.
But suppose one takes the other position: that the problem of
multiple classes of stock is both empirically and conceptually
unimportant. After all, even if private company shareholders can
manipulate the preferences of different classes of stock and thus
designate either party to a corporate combination to be the
purchasing corporation, their machinations will (in all but the rarest
cases) leave the other party to the combination as the target
corporation. As a result, exactly one set of shareholders will (almost)
always still be taxed. Does this mean that all is well in a Shakow-style
world?
Alas it does not. The Shakow-style tax regime has another and
considerably more important conceptual flaw. What determines
taxation under Shakow is the presence or absence of an ownership
change. For example, in Acquisition #2, Shakow would not tax H
because H is one of X's original shareholders and such shareholders as
a group own 50% of the surviving corporation (whether RUC as in
Variant 2A or X as in Variant 2B). This is nothing more than a type of
continuity-of-interest inquiry, and thus must succumb to all of the
problems that plague such an inquiry. In particular (and exactly as
under current law), H's taxation would depend not on the economic
characteristics of his own exchange, but on the economic
characteristics of the aggregation of the exchanges of all of X's
shareholders.
To see how this may matter under specific facts, consider yet
another variant of Acquisition #2. The combination will follow the
general outlines of Variant 2A, but with the following differences.
Suppose that the Class A shareholders of X do not merely want $40
per share of cash consideration, but actually want to be cashed out
entirely. Thus, RUC must find an additional $5 million of cash beyond
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the $20 million it will in any event borrow from Bank. To raise this
cash, RUC seeks an additional equity investment from its original
shareholders. Some subscribe and some don't. But in the end, RUC's
capitalization increases to 1.5 million shares of common stock and its
war chest increases to $25 million of cash.
The merger now proceeds apace. X merges with and into RUC,
and X's Class A shareholders each receive $50 per share of cash
consideration; X's Class B shareholders, including H, receive one
share of RUC common stock for each of their shares of X's Class B
Common Stock. Thus, after the combination, H owns exactly the same
thing that he owned in Acquisition #2A: 5% of the outstanding equity
of RUC. Moreover, RUC has exactly the same assets and the same
capitalization in each case. However, under a Shakow-type analysis, X
is now the target corporation (its shareholders own only 25% of the
surviving corporation) and RUC is now the purchasing corporation (it
shareholders own 75% of the surviving corporation). Accordingly, all
of X's shareholders, including H, are taxed on all of their gain. This
result is not only unfair - it is completely arbitrary. The fact that H,
who engages in a single course of economic conduct, is sometimes
taxed and is sometimes not, irrefutably demonstrates the lack of any
sound theoretical underpinning for this tax mechanism.
Is there any way to fix the Shakow-style regime, or create a robust
alternative intermediate option from the ground up? I do not think
either of these is possible in the absence of a clear answer to the
question: what exactly is an intermediate tax regime seeking to
accomplish? Consistency, sure. But not consistency for its own sake,
since there are extreme options - universal nonrecognition and
universal recognition - that are also consistent. Rather, an
intermediate option by definition seeks to sort the entire universe of
corporate combinations into two categories: those in which something
sufficiently significant happened to warrant taxation, and those in
which it did not.
What, as a purely conceptual matter, should constitute
significance? Shakow does not provide a clear answer, and that is
what leads him astray. Two further examples will illustrate the
quandary. First, suppose that H is a human shareholder who owns
25 % of the only class of X stock and J is a second human shareholder
who owns the remaining 75% of X's stock. If J sells all of his X stock
to K, a third human, should H be taxed? Under the facts, X has
experienced a 75% ownership change, but it has experienced such
change without experiencing any accompanying change in its assets.
While Shakow does not explicitly address this fact pattern, I do not
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think he would impose tax on H.
Second, suppose that H and J own all of the stock of X, exactly as
above, and that X is unleveraged. Suppose X borrows an amount
equal to three times its entire net worth from Bank and uses the
proceeds to purchase a new (possibly corporate) business. Should H
be taxed? Under these facts, the assets underlying H's X stock have
significantly changed; fully 75% of such assets are new. But the
change in H's indirectly owned assets has not been accompanied by
any change in X's ownership. Once again, although Shakow does not
explicitly address this fact pattern, I do not think that he would
impose tax on H.
Thus, while neither a stand-alone change in a corporation's assets
nor a stand-alone change in its ownership is or even can be sufficiently
significant to trigger recognition, a combination of such changes can
be. This result is not defensible. In order to design a defensible
intermediate option, one which can deal with fact patterns such as the
two immediately above, I will fill the theoretical void by offering my
own definition of significance.
Significance for tax purposes must be an economic concept. What
matters to a human shareholder, H, of X corporation is neither the
corporate name that X plasters on his shares of stock, nor (except in
rare cases) the names of the other human and nonhuman owners of
X's stock, but rather the economic characteristics of the assets (and/or
businesses) that H's shares represent. Thus, if a tax regime seeks to
tax H on the basis of something that matters, it should focus
exclusively on events that affect H's interest in the assets of X. What
are such events? The most obvious are events that actually change the
assets that X owns. 75 These come in four basic types:
75 In addition, X can engage in transactions that do not affect its actual asset

mix, but simply its capital structure. Thus, X can issue new equity and use the
proceeds to retire debt, or it can borrow and use the proceeds to repurchase some of
its equity. In each of these cases, H's post-event shares will continue to represent an
interest in exactly the same assets as before (for the simple reason that X has neither
bought nor sold any assets). But the nature of the interest will be different. For
example, in the case of an issue of new equity, H will participate to a lesser degree in
any increase in the value of X's original assets, but will not go under water as quickly
in the event of a decrease in the value of such assets.
Finally, H can also engage in transactions other than selling shares of X that will
affect his indirect interest in X's assets. For example, H can sell a call option against
his or her X stock. Such a sale is effectively a dilution of H's interest in X's assets
accompanied by a new investment in whatever assets are acquired with the option
sale proceeds. Alternatively, H can pledge his or her X stock as security for a loan and
use the loan proceeds to purchase an alternative investment. Such a transaction also
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Concentration. X can sell assets and use the proceeds to retire
debt, retire stock, or pay dividends. In each of these cases, H's postevent shares will no longer represent an indirect interest in certain of
X's original assets, but will represent a more concentrated indirect
interest in X's remaining assets. From H's perspective, it is as if he
has exchanged his indirect interest in some assets for an indirect
interest in other assets (admittedly assets in which he already had an
indirect interest).
Exchange. X can sell assets and use the proceeds to buy new
assets of either a similar or an entirely different sort. In each of these
cases, H's post-event shares will no longer represent an indirect
interest in certain of X's original assets, will represent an unchanged
indirect interest in the remainder of X's original assets, and will
represent a wholly new indirect interest in X's newly purchased
assets. 7' From H's perspective, it is as if he has exchanged his indirect
interest in some assets for an indirect interest in other assets (in this
case, assets in which he did not previously have an indirect interest).
Dilution with Leverage. X can borrow and use the proceeds to buy
new assets of either a sort that is similar to X's existing assets or a sort
that is entirely different from X's existing assets. In each of these
cases, H's post-event shares will represent a reduced indirect interest
in X's existing assets (in the case of a sufficiently bad outcome for the
combination of the original and the newly purchased assets, X will
turn over some or all of the original assets to its lenders) and a wholly
new indirect interest in X's newly purchased assets. From H's
perspective, it is as if he has exchanged an indirect contingent interest
in all of his assets for an indirect interest in other assets (in which he
did not previously have an indirect interest).
Dilution without Leverage. X can issue new equity and use the
proceeds to buy new assets of either a sort that is similar to X's
existing assets or a sort that is entirely different from X's existing
assets. In each of these cases, H's post-event shares will represent a
reduced indirect interest in X's existing assets (X's new shareholders
will enjoy both a share of the upside and a share of the downside of
such assets' performance) and a wholly new, indirect interest in X's
effectively dilutes H's interest in X's assets in exchange for a new interest in the
alternative investment.
76 The same phenomenon will occur in the case of a split-off of split-up that is
currently tax-deferred under section 355. I.R.C. § 355.
77 X buys and sells assets all the time in the "ordinary course" of business.
Although it may be difficult, one may want to differentiate such purchases and sales
from those not occurring in the "ordinary course" of business.
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newly purchased assets. From H's perspective, it is as if he has
exchanged an indirect proportional interest in all of his assets for an
indirect interest in other assets (in which he did not previously have
an indirect interest).
Note that in each of these circumstances, the transaction, from
H's perspective, is exactly the same: H "exchanges" an indirect
interest in some or all of the assets he originally owns (either some but
not all of those assets are disposed of in their entirety, or a contingent
or proportional undivided interest in 11 of those assets is disposed of)
for an indirect interest in other assets (which may be assets in which
he already owns an indirect interest, or not). Thus there cannot be any
justifiable reason to impose realization on H under some, but not all,
of these circumstances. Nonetheless, a robust reorganization provision
that imposes tax on some, but not all, reorganizations, would attempt
to do precisely that. Such a provision would single out the fourth
pattern above for taxation (assuming further that the corporation's
assets changed to a sufficiently great degree), while leaving the other
patterns untouched.
Would it be possible to impose realization on H under any of the
foregoing patterns, provided only that X's assets change to a sufficient
degree? It would be difficult, to say the least. First, a number of
threshold questions would need to be addressed, such as whether it is
appropriate to ignore passive assets, or asset sales and purchases that
occur in the ordinary course of business, or subsequent sales of newly
purchased assets (since they do not constitute sales of an original
asset), and so forth.
Second, however such questions are answered, X would need to
keep a separate record and perform a separate calculation for each
shareholder. This is somewhat analogous to the records and
calculations generally required in the publicly traded partnership
context, but now imposed on all entities irrespective of their size, the
number of their owners, their legal form, etc. It would certainly be
possible. However, it is difficult to argue that it would be worthwhile.
Indeed, Shakow very likely limited his proposal to asset changes that
occur as a result of one type of readily observable event because he
deemed it not to be worthwhile. Unfortunately, while such
compromises may be necessary in the interest of sound tax
administration, they are impossible to justify as a matter of theory.
The third, and perhaps most important consideration, is that it
would be necessary to decide when a change in X's underlying assets
during H's ownership of X's shares is sufficiently great that H should
be deemed to have experienced a realization event. A 50% threshold
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has superficial appeal, but is there really so much difference between
a shareholder whose indirectly owned assets have changed by 40%
and one whose indirectly owned assets have changed by 50%, so that
it makes sense to tax only the latter? I hardly think so. If it is not, then
there are only two truly defensible positions: either H should be
immediately (and therefore continuously) taxed on any change in X's
assets, however small, or H should not be taxed on any change in X's
assets, however large.
C. Extreme Options
As applied to corporate reorganizations and other acquisitions,
these are the two extreme options: full recognition and no recognition.
The first is essentially Brauner's proposal - repeal of the corporate
reorganization rules - expanded for the sake of consistency so that
shareholders of corporate parties to reorganizations (or other
corporate acquisitions) are taxed not only if they experience a
realization event, but even if they do not. The second is essentially the
ALI's proposal: shareholders of corporate parties to reorganizations
(or other corporate acquisitions) are not taxed whether or not they
experience a realization event, unless they end up holding
nonqualified consideration, such as cash.
Taking the full recognition proposal first, what are its strengths?
Just one thing, I think: it might reduce the distortions that accompany
income tax deferral, at least in the corporate context. Not only would
human shareholders who previously relied on corporate
reorganizations be forced to ante up tax on their unrealized gains, so
too would human shareholders of the surviving corporations involved
in such reorganizations.
However, I am skeptical that this benefit would be realized to any
significant extent.. Under a full recognition regime, I would expect to
see a complete halt to explicit corporate acquisition activity. If in
Acquisition #1 above, not only X's shareholder, H, but each and every
one of GE's shareholders was forced to recognize all of their
otherwise unrealized gain, GE would never acquire X. Rather, X and
GE would seek transactions, short of a full-blown acquisition, that
would give each party as much of what it wants as possible. Thus, X
might sell its assets to GE (which might at least save GE's
shareholders from taxation, depending on how the rules are written),
X might lease a large fraction of its assets to GE, or X and GE might
enter into some sort of partnership arrangement. Creative solutions
would surely flourish.
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If the benefits of full recognition are likely to be largely
ephemeral, what about the detriments? These, I fear, would be all too
real. First and foremost, the full recognition regime, expanded to be
consistent, lacks an underlying theory. This is not, of course,
Brauner's fault, but mine. Brauner has an underlying theory: he would
tax all shareholder realization events. Period. The problem with this
approach is not its lack of theoretical underpinning, but its lack of
consistency. The form of any given corporate transaction would be
massaged so that shareholders seeking to avoid recognition would
simply hold their shares. Such shareholders would not experience a
realization event, and so would continue to enjoy nonrecognition in
spite of Brauner. It was to fix this consistency problem that I added
deemed realization to Brauner: any shareholder of a corporation
involved in a reorganization-like transaction is deemed to experience
a realization event, whether or not he continues to own his original
shares. No nonrecognition provision is available in the event of either
an actual or a deemed realization.
Unfortunately, once deemed realization is added to the mix, all of
the theoretical problems discussed in the context of the intermediate
taxation options emerge. In particular, there would be no theoretical
reason to single out stock-based corporate acquisitions: realization
would be equally appropriate for shareholders of corporations that
acquired other corporations for cash, acquired such corporations'
assets for cash, or acquired noncorporate assets for cash. There is no
defensible stopping point on this slippery slope, short of taxing
shareholders each and every time that the corporation exchanged any
asset at all. Such taxation is continuous taxation, or mark-to-market
taxation. While it is quite defensible in theory, it is well beyond the
extreme option envisioned by Brauner.
In addition to the lack of a theoretical underpinning, or even in
the presence of such theoretical underpinning (as would be the case if
full recognition were deemed to be synonymous with mark-tomarket), full recognition taxation carries with it a host of problems. I
count at least five, all of which have been elaborated to a greater or
lesser degree above: (1) discrimination against corporate transactions
in favor of noncorporate transactions, assuming that nonrecognition
rules in noncorporate contexts remain unchanged, (2) probable
discrimination against public company corporate transactions in favor
of private company corporate transactions, assuming that full
recognition is either inapplicable or differently applicable in private
company contexts due to the absence of readily available valuation
data, (3) taxation of shareholders in the absence of cash receipts and

2007]

Taxation of Reorganizations

perhaps even in the absence of liquidity, (4) possible taxation of
shareholders in the absence of objective valuation data, and (5)
taxation of shareholders in the absence of any voluntary transaction
and in certain circumstances in the absence of any transaction at all,
voluntary or otherwise (as would be the case if recognition applied to

shareholders of both the target and the acquiring corporation, as
would be demanded by consistency).
Turning at last to the only proposal still standing, the no
recognition proposal, what can be said in its defense? Actually quite a
lot: in particular, it does not suffer from any of the infirmities already
elaborated for either an intermediate recognition regime or a full
recognition regime. Moreover, it is breathtakingly simple. Finally, it is
unlikely to meaningfully increase the tax-regime-based inefficiency of
shareholder behavior, also known as the "lock-in" effect. The lion's
share of such inefficiency is a direct result of the realization principle
in its naked glory. Furthermore, neither incrementally reducing the
effect of such principle by making nonrecognition randomly (from a
shareholder's perspective) inapplicable to certain corporate mergers
and acquisitions nor incrementally increasing its effects by making
nonrecognition applicable to a broader array of corporate mergers
and acquisitions is likely to have any meaningful impact on the
underlying problem."8
The total size of the United States equity market is approximately $16.4
trillion. Crain Communications, Pensions and Investments (Oct. 30, 2006). The total
value of United States mergers and acquisitions in 2005 was $1.0 trillion. Purchase
Price ($ in Millions) 1986-2005, MERGERSTAT REV. (FactSet Mergerstat, L.L.C.),
2006, at 9. Approximately 54% of such mergers and acquisitions featured solely cash
consideration, while another 25% featured a combination of cash and stock. Payment
Trends 1986-2005, MERGERSTAT REV. (FactSet Mergerstat, L.L.C.), 2006, at 14. Thus,
it would appear that a total of $0.8 trillion of potentially table merger consideration
was paid in 2005. Even if all of this consideration was paid to purchase the stock of
publicly traded companies, less than 5% of such stock was so acquired during the
given year. Even in the case of a shareholder with a diversified portfolio, this amount
of random unwanted recognition is unlikely to have a dramatic impact on his
behavior.
Moreover, there are at least two reasons to believe that the actual share of an
individual's portfolio that is likely to be annually acquired in unwanted taxable
transactions is significantly lower than the 5% figure. First, the merger and acquisition
statistics quoted above include transactions in which corporate businesses, but not the
corporations themselves, are acquired. Thus, if a large publicly traded company sells
one of its businesses, that shows up in the statistics. But that will never lead to an
unwanted taxable event for a shareholder. Second, the very largest public deals tend
to be stock acquisitions: the cash acquisition market simply has not developed to the
point where the likes of Bell South (by AT&T), or Warner-Lambert (by Pfizer), or
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expanded

availability

of

nonrecognition treatment is the only defensible change to the taxation
of corporate mergers and acquisitions, it is necessary to decide where
to draw the line on nonrecognition. Should one, as the ALl proposed,

draw the line at the receipt of consideration other than stock, making
any such receipt taxable? I think not. I think that inherent in the
realization principle is the notion that it should be the taxpayer's own
choice that determines when he will be taxed on his gain with respect
to any single investment. Thus, if a conceded realization event occurs

that is not of the shareholder's choosing and, moreover, is against his
wishes, such realization event should not result in the immediate
payment of tax. Congress has recognized this principle in noncorporate contexts: section 1033 applies to "involuntary conversions"
of property, but that provision does not include within the definition
of "involuntary conversion" the "forced sale or exchange" of

corporate stock pursuant to a merger or acquisition.79 I think that the
involuntary conversion rules, or something very similar, but with a

considerably shorter reinvestment window to reflect the fact that
finding replacement property in the corporate equity context is
generally easier than finding replacement property in the context of
other types of property, should be made applicable to corporate
mergers and acquisitions.
This suggestion has been made once before, albeit as a throwaway remark.' That remark has been criticized by Brauner, who
AOL (by Time, Inc.) can be acquired for cash. Thus, while the majority of deals may
well be for cash, the majority of consideration is surely not cash. This, again, means
that the likelihood of an unwanted taxable transaction is far lower than the statistics
suggest.
79 The more or less obvious motivation behind the involuntary
conversion
provisions, which were first codified in the 1921 Act, is that it would be "unjust" to tax
any gain arising from such conversions; to do so would be rubbing (tax) salt into the
wound. See CLARENCE MCCARTHY, BILLY MANN & WILLIAM GREGORY, THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX: ITS SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS

396 (1971). But the truth is

that the Congress had an additional, subtler motivation. Much of the early
involuntary conversion activity resulted from the Federal Government's confiscation
of property connected with its efforts in World War I. Taxpayers were much less
likely to challenge these confiscations if they were not additionally saddled with a tax
burden. See, e.g., JOSEPH KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 915 (1929); cf.
SEIDMAN, 1953-1939, supra note 43, at 1583 (discussing similar motivations for an
expansion of then section 112(f) in light of taxpayer reluctance to play along with
Federal Government acquisitions of property in connection with the defense
program). Still, the involuntary conversion provisions have never been limited to
involuntary conversions caused by the Federal Government.
so See Ulysses S. Crockett, Jr., Federal Taxation of Corporate Unifications: A
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correctly notes that the possibility of a merger or acquisition is
inherent in any shareholder's stock, and that there is accordingly no

unfairness in taxing such shareholder as and when a merger or
acquisition

arises, regardless

of whether

the shareholder

has

consented.8 ' But Brauner's argument proves too much. The possibility
of destruction by fire or confiscation in an eminent domain
proceeding is inherent in many types of property, but that does not
make such property ineligible for nonrecognition relief under section
1033. Thus, the premise behind the current involuntary conversion

provision can be none other than that it is unfair to remove from the
taxpayer the unilateral right to determine when he will recognize his
gain. Period. This argument has as much force when the property is
common stock as when it is real property or livestock.'
My proposal is the following: a shareholder whose stock is sold or
exchanged pursuant to a merger or acquisition should be entitled to

nonrecognition treatment so long as and to the extent that either (1)
he or she receives stock in the acquiring corporation or (2) he or she
involuntarily receives consideration other than stock in the acquiring
corporation but promptly and appropriately reinvests such
consideration. The first clause simply follows the ALI Project and so

Review of Legislative Policy, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1976).
1 See Brauner, supra note 13, at 15 n.50.
One way in which it might be possible to attempt to distinguish the forced
sale
of a taxpayer's stock from a more generic involuntary conversion of a taxpayer's
property is to note that in the former case, but not in the latter, the taxpayer is in
theory being represented in the relevant transaction by his duly appointed agents the board of directors - and should therefore be bound for all purposes, including
tax purposes, by the decisions of those agents. While this argument will distinguish a
forced sale of stock from the receipt of insurance proceeds following a fire, it will not
distinguish a forced sale of stock from a forced sale of land pursuant to an eminent
domain confiscation. The reason is that the actor in the last case, the local
government, is as much an agent of the taxpayer as is his board of directors.
A second and related way in which it might be possible to justify tax
discrimination against a forced sale of a taxpayer's stock is to point out the similarity
of such forced sale to the receipt of an unwanted dividend. Would I extend
nonrecognition to a prompt reinvestment by a shareholder of an unwanted dividend
(e.g., a reinvestment that occurs in the context of a dividend reinvestment plan)? I
would not. Dividends, even extraordinary dividends, are part and parcel of an
investment in corporate stock, just as rental receipts are part and parcel of an
investment in real estate. Tax law frequently distinguishes such periodic cash flows
and subjects them to a different tax treatment from a disposition of the entire
investment (indeed, this is the basis that generally distinguishes ordinary income from
capital gain). I see no reason why it should not do the same in the "involuntary
receipt" context.
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requires no additional explication. The second clause however
requires further discussion.
First, since it is beyond the scope of this article to convert the
current income tax into a cash flow or consumption tax, it is necessary
to distinguish the ordinary types of stock sales and reinvestments from
certain stock sales and reinvestments occurring in the mergers and
acquisitions context. The former are currently taxed and would
continue to be taxed under section 1001, while all, some, or none of
the latter would be entitled to nonrecognition treatment. I opt for
some of the latter. My reason for rejecting nonrecognition of all stock
sales and reinvestments occurring in the mergers and acquisitions
context is that many such stock sales are largely indistinguishable
from stock sales outside such context, and should thus be taxed the
same as sales outside of such context. My reason for rejecting
nonrecognition treatment of no stock sales and reinvestments
occurring in the mergers and acquisitions context was set forth above:
it is unfair to tax a shareholder on an involuntary sale of this stock.
That is why my second proposal contains the limiting word
"involuntarily."
Second, merely limiting the right to receive nonrecognition
treatment to circumstances under which involuntarily received nonstock consideration is promptly reinvested does not answer the
question of what is meant by "involuntarily." I would base the
determination of voluntariness on the shareholder's actions. Thus, the
shareholder would be entitled to claim that he received the resulting
consideration involuntarily if he votes against the merger or
acquisition, but not otherwise.
Third, nonrecognition treatment would be contingent on "prompt
and appropriate" reinvestment of non-stock consideration. Since my
idea is not to unduly expand the availability of nonrecognition
treatment, I would structure the reinvestment requirement so that it is
as narrow as practicable. Thus, if the shareholder's stock were
acquired by a public company, I would give the shareholder a very
short window - no more than a week - to reinvest his consideration
solely in the stock of the acquiring public company. In short, I would
place the shareholder in no better position than he would have been
in had the acquiring company given its own stock as consideration.83 In
Public companies frequently prefer to pay cash rather than stock. One reason
for this is that a payment of cash is viewed by the market as a better signal of
corporate discipline with respect to acquisitions. Another reason is that a host of
shareholders, including tax indifferent shareholders and risk arbitrageurs, prefer
receipts of cash.
83
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particular, and in keeping with the current corporate reorganization
provisions, the dispossessed shareholder would only receive
nonrecognition treatment if he maintained an indirect interest,
however attenuated, in his original assets.
If a shareholder's stock is acquired by a privately held
corporation, as would be the case in a management leveraged buyout,
it is impossible for the shareholder to reinvest his consideration in
such a way that he maintains an indirect interest in his original assets.
But even in such case, allowing unfettered reinvestment options is
unnecessary. To deal with this situation, I would propose, first that the
reinvestment window be expanded, perhaps to thirty days, and second
that the reinvestment choices be expanded, perhaps to the stock of
any company engaged in the same business as the acquired
corporation.'
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have examined human shareholder taxation in the
case of mergers and acquisitions. The relevant law is currently
extraordinarily complex, utterly inconsistent, and in many instances
arguably unfair. There are really only two plausible ways to cure these
ills. The first, to move to a tax system with more fulsome gain
recognition, ultimately in the form of mark-to-market taxation, is not
in my opinion technically or politically feasible. Accordingly, the
second, to move to a tax system with less gain recognition, merits
attention.
I propose such a tax system. In particular, under my proposal, a
human shareholder whose stock is sold or exchanged pursuant to a
merger or acquisition would be entitled to nonrecognition treatment
so long as either (1) he receives stock in the acquiring corporation or
(2) he involuntarily receives consideration other than stock in the
acquiring corporation but promptly and appropriately reinvests such
consideration.

This last rule could be operationalized by making use of Standard Industrial
Codes (SIC codes). A minimal requirement might be that the corporation whose
stock is purchased with the acquisition proceeds must have as a significant business
some business that belongs to the same SIC code as a significant business of the
acquired corporation.
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